State of Utah v. Troy Rees : Brief of Petitioner by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2003
State of Utah v. Troy Rees : Brief of Petitioner
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
H. Don Sharp; Counsel for Respondent.
Erin Riley; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; Counsel for Petitioner.
This Petition for Certiorari is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Petition for Certiorari, Utah v. Rees, No. 20030208.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/2356
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Petitioner/Appellee Case No. 20030208-SC 
TROY REES, 
Respondent/Appellant 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER STATE OF UTAH 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 






K F U 
50 
H. DON SHARP 
Key Bank Building, Suite 200 
2491 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone (801) 621-1567300 
Counsel for Respondent Rees 
ERIN RILEY (8375) 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone (801) 366-0180 
Counsel for Petitioner 
FILED 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
NOV 1 7 2003 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 




BRIEF OF PETITIONER STATE OF UTAH 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
H. DON SHARP 
Key Bank Building, Suite 200 
2491 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone (801) 621-1567300 
ERIN RILEY (8375) 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone (801) 366-0180 
Counsel for Petitioner 
Counsel for Respondent Rees 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES *ui 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW I 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY RESORTING TO THE COMMON 
LAW WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS, WHEN A CLEAR STATUTORY 
REMEDY EXISTS UNDER THE POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT 6 
A. The proper avenue for seeking relief is under the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act 7 
B. It is improper to resort to common law when a statutory remedy is 
available 10 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY REVERSED THE TRIAL 
COURT DECISION TO DISMISS THE PETITION 14 
A. The petition was improperly filed in the criminal case, instead of as a 
separate civil action 14 
B. The criminal trial court lacked jurisdiction and therefore properly 
dismissed the petition 16 
C. The petition was improperly filed under Rule 65B instead of under the 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act and Rule 65C 18 
I 
D. The court of appeals erroneously reviewed the matter as if the petition 
raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel when Rees never alleged 
ineffective assistance of counsel 20 
III. REES IS NOT ENTITLED TO A SECOND DIRECT APPEAL FROM THE 
SAME FINAL JUDGMENT 21 
CONCLUSION 24 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A - State v. Rees, 2003 UT App 4, 63 P.3d 120 
Addendum B - Statutes and rules 
Addendum C - State v. Rees, 2001 UT App. 27 (memorandum decision) 
Addendum D - Petition for Extraordinary Relief 
Addendum E - District court docket 
Addendum F - Brief of Appellant 
Addendum G - Statement of the facts in the underlying criminal case 
Addendum H - Shank v. Fuchs, 2000 WL 33250566 (memorandum decision) 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
In re Jacks, 266 B.R. 728 (9th Cir. 2001) 11 
Laffervy v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991), 
cert denied, 504 U.S. 911, 112 S.Ct. 1942(1992) 21 
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) 11 
Shriver v. Woodbine Sav. Bank of Woodbine, 285 U.S. 467, 52 S. Ct. 430 (1932) 11 
Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 120 S. Ct. 746 (2000) 23 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984) 23 
United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205(1952) 11 
STATE CASES 
A.J. MacKay Co. v. Okland Const. Co.,, 817 P.2d 323 (Utah 1991) 17 
Barton v. Barton, 2001 UT App. 199, 29 P.3d 13 17 
Brunerv. Carver, 920 P.2d 1153 (Utah 1996) 23 
Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associate, 752 P.2d 892 (Utah 1988) 16 
Butt v. Graham, 6 Utah 2, 307 P.2d 892 (1957) 9 
Butterfield v. Cook, 817 P.2d 333, 
cert denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991) 23 
Carter v. Galetka,200\ UT 96, 44 P.3d 626 23 
Elliott v. Bastion, 40 P.713 (Terr, of Utah 1895) 8 
Frost v. District Court, 83 P.2d 737 (Utah 1938) 17 
Gibbs v. Gibbs, 26 Utah 382, 73 P. 641 (Utah 1903) 10 
Huffman v. Alexander, 197 Or. 283, 253 P.2d 289 (Oregon 1953) 7. 8 
iii 
Indian Village Trading Post, Inc., v. Al Bench, 929 P.2d 367 (Utah App. 1996) 12 
Johnson v. Higley, 1999 UT App. 278, 989 P.2d 61 5 
Julian v. State, 2002 UT , 52 P.3d 1168,451 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 12 
Lopez v. Shulsen, 716 P.2d 787 (Utah 1986) 9, 12 
Otteson v. Department of Human Services, 945 P.2d 170 (Utah App. 1997) 16 
People v. Ingles, 97 Cal. App. 2d 867, 218 P.2d 987 (1950) 11 
People v. Lewis, 64 Cal. App. 2d 564, 149 P.2d 27 (1944) 11 
Rennv. Utah State Board ofPardons, 904 P. 2d 677 (Utah 1995) 12 
Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002 UT 7, 43 P.3d 467 6 
Saunders v. Sharp, 818 P.2d 574 (Utah App. 1991) 17 
Schoneyv. Memorial Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59 (Utah App. 1993) 17 
Scott County Fed. of Teachers v. Scott County School District #2, 
496 N.E.2d 610 (Ind.1986) 11 
Serrato v. Utah Transit Authority, 2000 UT App. 299, 13 P.3d 616 17 
Shunk v. Fuchs, 2000 WL. 33250566 (Utah App. May 4, 2000) 15 
Smith v. Sheffield, 58 Utah 77, 197 P. 605 (1921) 10 
State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, 63 P.2d 731 21 
State v. Babbel, 813 P.2d 86 (Utah 1991) 17 
State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, 46 P.3d 230 20 
State v. Gee, 30 Utah 2d 148, 514 P.2d 809 (Utah 1973) 8, 9, 10 
State v. Hallett, 856 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1993) 22 
State v. James, 2000 UT 80, 13 P.3d 576 2 
iv 
State v. Jiminez, 9?8 P.2d 264 .'Utah 1 ° ° ^ " 
S,...- ) 
State v. Julian, 966 P.2d 249 (1998) _. 
State v . Lafferp "40 P 2d 12"»o n 'tan 1 ° 9 ^ "" 
5' .. 
State v. Miller, lol Kan. 21U, .00 P.2d 680
 v . , >~) 
State v. Mitchell, 569 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1 o ™ < 5 
Sta te v. Montoya, 825 * 7 
State v. Palmer, 777 ?.2d 521 (Utah App 1989) 17 
State y Pjrker.^ZPZA""' 'Trtah spp. 1994) 19 
& . . - •• 2 
State v. Ree±, ZUKJI ^ » ^ p p . ±, 3 , 2 1 , 2 2 
State Rce< : n m I " " \ • • ' ^ P 3d 12A . pass im 
5Vfl?t . n- dijtensieui, ns . . - \ 
, . - / ' A - H ; ^ . / i A O l ' • ' : * . " • • - - - ^ 6 
5M///VC//: ' . r w . 22 ! lah 2d 85. 448 P 2d 907
 ( | >ms, - • - . - -
Turner \ , ;...i,.*.. , ... «,.»it > .,...)/;»",, . , ia.vai. _ ' • , . , . . 
I •> '-• • '~ n * ' - ' ' Utah App. 1989) i< 
^a / t e r v SVate. 624 P.2d 687 (Utah 19* l 
Ua.u >• < 9 
n ' i . ' " • • •• "• ' x ' • i i 
V 
DOCKETED CASES 
State v. Rees, No. 20010490-CA (Utah App. March 25, 2002) 5 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1998 & Supp. 2000) 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (Supp. 2001) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-4 (1986) 1 
Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-101 (1996) 2,4,6,9, 19 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-102 (1996) 10, 15, 18 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104 (1996) 7, 8 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-108 (1996) 24 
Utah R. App. P. 11 6 
Utah R. App. P. 46 24 
Utah R. of Civ. P. 65B 2, 9, 14 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65C passim 
VI 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 




BRIEF OF PETITIONER STATE OF UTAH 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This Court granted certiorari to review the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in State 
v. Rees, 2003 UT App 4, 63 P.3d 120 (addendum A), which reversed the district court's 
denial of Rees's petition for extraordinary relief. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 2001) & UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-4 (1986). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did die Court of Appeals err by resurrecting die ancient common law writ 
of error coram nobis when a clear statutory remedy is available to Rees under the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act? 
1 
Standard of Review: On certiorari review, this Court reviews the decision of the 
court of appeals, not the trial court, for correctness and without deference to its conclusions 
of law. State v. James, 2000 UT 80, p , 13 P.3d 576 (citations omitted). 'The correctness 
of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that court accurately reviewed the trial 
court's decision under the appropriate standard of review." Id. 
Issue II: Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial court's decision to 
dismiss the petition for extraordinary relief? 
Standard of Review: Same as above. 
Issue III. Did the Court of Appeals err by ruling that Rees may be entitled to a 
second direct appeal from the same final judgment? 
Standard of Review: This is an issue of law which should be reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following relevant statutes and rules are set forth in full in addendum B: 
The Post-Conviction Remedies Act UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-10l et seq. (1996); 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C (1996); 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B (1996); 
Former Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B(b) (1977). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 4, 1999, Rees was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to 
distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(iii) (1998 
& Supp. 2000) (R. 1). Rees moved to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrantless 
2 
search of his trailer home (R. 26). The trial court denied Rees's motion and found Rees 
guilty as charged (R. 104:2-7). The court imposed a 0-5 year prison term, which was 
suspended in lieu of a 3-year probationary term (R. 86). Rees timely appealed (R. 95). 
On appeal, Rees was represented by trial counsel. Counsel failed to include the 
preliminary hearing transcript, the suppression hearing transcript, and the affidavit in 
support of the search warrant in the record on appeal. Absent an adequate record, the court 
of appeals could not address the issues raised and presumed the correctness of the 
disposition made by the trial court. Rees's conviction was affirmed. See State v. Rees, 2001 
UT App. 27 (unpublished memorandum decision) (Feb. 1, 2001) (addendum C). 
On April 12,2001, Rees, still represented by the same counsel, filed a motion for re-
sentencing in the underlying criminal case (R. 112-114). Rees stated that the purpose of the 
motion was to allow him to re-file his appeal (R. 112). On May 9,2001, one day before the 
scheduled hearing, Rees apparently realized that a motion to re-sentence was not the 
appropriate way to seek relief. He then filed a petition for extraordinary relief (R. 121-123). 
However, the petition was filed in the original criminal case, no. 991900480, instead of as 
a separate civil action (R. 121-123, addendum D). The petition did not raise any claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The petition stated: 
The reason for requesting extraordinary relief is that the Defendant's 
appeal was denied for the failure of certain transcripts having not been filed 
with the Court of Appeals. These transcripts had been timely ordered, paid 
for and were on file with the Clerk of the District Court but were not filed 
with the rest of the record. This was through no fault of the Defendant/7 
Petitioner, but the Defendant/Petitioner is restrained by the 45 day jail 
sentence pending if he is not granted the relief requested herein. 
3 
(R. 121). The relief Rees requested was that he be re-sentenced and allowed to file a second 
appeal (R. 123). 
On May 10,2001, the trial court dismissed the petition. In its minute entry, the court 
said: 'This is time [sic] set for motion hearing on the motion for extraordinary relief. 
Hearing not held. State1 objects to the motion filed as the case has already been adjudicated 
in the Court of Appeals. Court dismisses the petition and finds that the case has been 
adjudicated in the Court of Appeals" (R. 128)(addendum E). 
Rees appealed the trial court's dismissal of his petition. On appeal, Rees stated that 
"[t]he issue before this Court if [sic] the Trial Court committed err [sic] in not considering 
the defendant's lack of fault in a procedural defect in the appeal process." (addendum F). 
Again, Rees did not raise any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
On appeal, the State filed a motion for summary disposition requesting that the court 
of appeals reverse and remand to the district court, so that the matter could be properly filed 
as a civil petition for post-conviction relief, pursuant to The Post-Conviction Remedies Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 et. seq. and Utah R. Civ. P. 65C, and the Attorney General 
could respond to the petition at the district court level. The court of appeals denied the 
1
 A prosecutor was present on May 10, but no one from the Attorney General's 
office was present. "If the petition is a challenge to a felony conviction or sentence, the 
respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney General." Utah R. Civ. P. 
65C(h). The Attorney General was not notified that a petition had been filed, was not 
asked to respond, was not present when the petition was dismissed, and was not notified 
that the petition had been dismissed. 
4 
State's motion for summary disposition. State v. Rees, No. 20010490-CA (Utah App. 
March 25, 2002). 
Instead, the court of appeals, without oral argument, reversed on a ground that was 
never asserted or briefed on any level. The court of appeals found that "while Rees's 
petition for extraordinary relief fails to articulate a clear or concise claim, our reading of the 
petition suggests that the petition is predicated on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel." State v. Rees, 2003 UT App 4, f 8, 63 P.3d 120. The court of appeals 
then resorted to an ancient common law writ, concluding that "Rees's petition for 
extraordinary relief is best described as rooted in the ancient writ of error coram nobis" Id. 
The court of appeals reversed and remanded to the district court, with the additional 
instruction that "should Rees prevail, the trial court's authority is limited to merely re-
sentencing Rees nunc-pro-tunc." Id. at f^ 16. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts essential to this petition are included in the statement of the case. The facts 
of the underlying criminal conviction, taken from the State's brief in the direct appeal (case 
no. 991078-CA), are included for the information of the Court as addendum G. Those facts 
are stated in the light most favorable to the bench verdict. See Johnson v. Higley, 1999 UT 
App 278,112, 989 P.2d 61,61 (bench trial). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals improperly reversed the district court decision without oral 
argument on a ground that was not briefed, and that was never raised by Rees. In reversing 
5 
the district court's denial of the petition for extraordinary relief, the court of appeals erred 
by resorting to use of the common law writ of error coram nobis, thereby circumventing the 
appropriate statutory avenue for relief available under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-101 et seq., and Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C. The court of 
appeals' decision departs from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings and 
conflicts with decisions of this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY RESORTING TO THE COMMON 
LAW WRIT OF ERROR CORAM NOBIS, WHEN A CLEAR STATUTORY 
REMEDY EXISTS UNDER THE POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT. 
On appeal, it is appellant's burden to ensure that a complete record has been 
provided. UtahR. App. P. 11. Absent an adequate record, "defendant's assignment of error 
stands as a unilateral allegation which the review court has no power to determine." 
Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002 UT 7, f 8, 43 P.3d 467 (quoting State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 
289, 293, cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044, 103 S.Ct. 1443 (1982)). Where the record is 
inadequate, the appellate court will assume the regularity of the underlying proceeding. 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, t 17, 12 P.3d 92. 
Rees's appellate counsel performed deficiently by failing to ensure that necessary 
parts of the trial record were made part of the record on appeal.2 Consequently, the court 
2
 The State concedes that counsel on appeal performed deficiently but does not 
concede that Rees can meet the prejudice prong of the test in order to establish ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel. 
6 
of appeals affirmed Rees's conviction. Rees had a clear-cut legal avenue to seek relief: a 
civil petition for post-conviction relief pursuant to the Post-Conviction Remedies Act and 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C. The Post-Conviction Remedies Act specifically provides 
that a petitioner may file a new, civil action seeking relief on the ground that "the petitioner 
had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah 
Constitution." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(l)(d)( 1996). 
Rather than pursue this available remedy, counsel for Rees committed two missteps. 
First, he improperly filed a petition for extraordinary relief in the underlying criminal case, 
rather than as an independent civil action under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. Second, 
he failed to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. In view of these 
omissions, the district court properly dismissed the petition. 
As a consequence of counsel's choices, Rees's appellate claims were not reviewed 
on the merits. In an apparent attempt to afford Rees the review his counsel had failed to 
obtain, the court of appeals ignored the only appropriate avenue of relief - the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act - and instead resorted, not merely to a common law remedy, but 
to an ancient writ the Post-Conviction Remedies Act was expressly designed to supersede. 
This was error. 
A. The proper avenue for seeking relief is under the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act. 
The ancient writ of error coram nobis was a common-law device designed to allow 
a trial court to review an error of fact. Huffman v. Alexander, 197 Or. 283, 293, 253 P.2d 
7 
289, 340 (Oregon 1953). "While the writ is recognized as an existing common-law remedy 
in some jurisdictions, it is almost obsolete.^ " Huffman, 253 P.2d at 340, citing 24 C.J.S., 
Criminal Law, § 1606, p. 144; and see 31 Am.Jur., Judgments, §§ 798-812. In some 
jurisdictions, including Utah, "post-conviction statutes have been passed which take the 
place of all proceedings in the nature of coram nobis and which eliminate much of the 
uncertainty as to the scope of that remedy." Huffman, 253 P.2d at 341. 
The common law writ of error coram nobis is limited to an error of fact for which the 
Legislature has provided no remedy. State v. Gee, 30 Utah 2d 148, 150, 514 P.2d 809, 811 
(Utah 1973). Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act provides a remedy. It is the appropriate 
avenue for seeking relief when a defendant claims that he "had ineffective assistance of 
counsel in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution." Utah Code 
Ann. §78-35a-104(l)(d). 
More than a hundred years ago, when the common law writ of error coram nobis was 
in general use, there was no remedy by appeal, or by motion for a new trial, [or by a petition 
for post-conviction relief]. See State v. Gee, 30 Utah 2d 148, 150, 514 P.2d 809, 810 (Utah 
1973); and Huffman v. Alexander, 197 Or. 283, 293, 253 P.2d 289, 341 (1953). 
"Subsequently these remedies came into existence by statutory enactment and supplanted 
3
 Common law writs such as the writ of error coram nobis fell into disuse in Utah, 
and most other states, as early as 1895. See Elliott v. Bastian, 40 P.713 (Terr, of Utah 
1895) ("these writs have fallen into desuetude in most of the states); Sullivan v. Turner, 
22 Utah 2d 85, 448 P.2d 907 (Utah 1968) (writ of error coram nobis is available in a 
proper case, but "its use is even more rare and restricted than that of habeas corpus"). 
8 
much of the former scope of the writ." Gee, 514 P.2d at 810. Use of a petition for writ of 
error coram nobis became very uncommon. "Coram nobis is a limited remedy of narrow 
scope and is available, where no other remedy exists . . ." Lopez v Shulsen, 716 P.2d 787, 
788, n. 1 (Utah 1986). 
Previously in Utah, a petitioner seeking certain kinds of post-conviction relief could 
have filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a petition for writ of error coram nobis. 
See Sullivan v Turner, 22 Utah 2d 85, 448 P.2d 907 (1968); Ward v. Turner, 12 Utah 2d 
3l0,366P.2d72(1961);£wffv Graham, 6 Utah 2, 133, 307 P.2d 892 (1957). However, 
in 1969/ former Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B(i) was enacted, which included 
provisions for "Postconviction Hearings." Former Rule 65B stated: "Special forms of 
pleadings and of writs in habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition, 
and other extraordinary writs, as heretofore known, are hereby abolished. Where no other 
plain, speedy and adequate remedy exists, relief may be obtained by appropriate action 
under these Rules." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a)(1977)(emphasis added). The Rule was 
amended numerous times over the following years. 
In 1996, the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 et seq. 
and Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C were enacted. The Post-Conviction Remedies Act 
and Rule 65C replaced the provisions of former Rule 65B which governed certain post-
conviction proceedings. The Post-Conviction Remedies Act "establishes a substantive legal 
4
 "Rule 65B(i) was adopted by the Supreme Court effective August 20, 1969." 
Compiler's Notes, Utah R. Civ. P. 65(B)(i)( 1977). 
9 
remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or sentence and who has exhausted all 
other legal remedies." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-102( 1). Rule 65C contains the procedural 
provisions for the filing and commencement of a petition under the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act. 
Before enactment of the current Post-Conviction Remedies Act, this Court 
recognized the "availability of a writ of error coram nobis in a proper case" but noted that 
"its use is even more rare and restricted than that of habeas corpus." Sullivan v. Turner, 22 
Utah 2d 85, 88, 448 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah 1968). The court of appeals found that "Rees's 
petition presents a rarely encountered situation" Rees, 2003 UT App. at U 12. To the 
contrary, defendants frequently allege that counsel performed deficiently upon appeal. 
When seeking a remedy for this type of allegation, the appropriate avenue for relief is to file 
a civil petition for post-conviction relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. 
B. It is improper to resort to common law when a statutory remedy 
is available. 
"The functions of the writ of coram nobis are strictly limited to an error of fact for 
which the legislature has provided no remedy, for it is only when the defendant is wholly 
without remedy that the common law provides one." Gee, 514 P.2d at 811. When a statute 
exists which properly governs a matter or provides an avenue for relief, it is improper to 
resort to the common law. See Smith v. Sheffield, 58 Utah 77, 197 P. 605, 607 (1921) 
(Statute held that wife was not a competent witness against her husband and therefore 
excluded resort to the common law); Gibbs v. Gibbs, 26 Utah 382, 73 P. 641 (Utah 1903) 
10 
(question must be determined by reference to the statute and "in the absence of statutory 
regulation, resort must be had to the rules of common law"). 
"[W]here a statute creates a liability and provides a remedy by suit specially adapted 
to its enforcement, other less appropriate common-law remedies are impliedly excluded." 
Shriverv Woodbine Sav Bank of Woodbine, 285 U.S. 467, 478, 52 S.Ct. 430, 434 (1932). 
See also Turner v. Hawaii Paroling Authority, 93 Hawaii 298, 1 P.3d 768 (2000) ( "any 
post-conviction remedy which is available under this rule will require a resort to this rule 
in place of habeas corpus, coram nobis or any other vehicle").5 
This Court has recognized that "[t]he postconviction hearing procedure is a successor 
to the common-law writ of error coram nobis." State v Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 
1981).6 Johnson explains that the remedy formerly available under coram nobis was 
adopted by Utah and is available under the post-conviction procedures. Accordingly, courts 
5
 And see also In re Jacks, 266 B.R. 728 (9th Cir. 2001) (by codifying statutory 
remedies the legislature has occupied the field and precluded resort to common law); 
Scott County Fed of Teachers v Scott County School Dist #2, 496 N.E.2d 610 (Ind 
1986) (where statute provides for remedy it excludes any common law or equitable 
procedure); People v Ingles, 97 Cal.App.2d 867, 218 P.2d 987 (1950)(statutory remedy 
displaces the common-law remedy); People v Lewis, 64 Cal. App. 2d 564, 149 P.2d 27 
(1944)(the existence of a statutory remedy precludes resort to the common law); Wike v 
Lightner, 1829 WL 2573 (Pa) ("common law remedies shall be superseded in all cases 
where a remedy is provided by act of assembly). 
6
 Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has stated that in the federal arena, 
"28 U.S.C. § 2255, which provides federal prisoners a statutory motion to vacate a federal 
sentence. . . 'restates, clarifies and simplifies the procedure in the nature of the ancient 
writ of error coram nobis.'" Plaut v Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 235, (1995) 
(quoting United States v Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 218 (1952). 
11 
in Utah have treated petitions filed as writs of error coram nobis as petitions for writ of 
habeas corpus or post-conviction relief. See Lopez v. Shulsen, 716 P.2d 787, 789 (Utah 
1986); Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687 (Utah 1981). 
Here, the court of appeals found that "Rees's petition for extraordinary relief is best 
described as rooted in the ancient writ of error coram nobis, and therefore, the petition was 
properly filed with Rees's sentencing court." Rees, 2003 UT App. at 1J8. The court of 
appeals erred by viewing the petition as a writ of error coram nobis under the common law, 
since the Legislature has provided a clear statutory avenue for relief under the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act. Rees had an appropriate statutory avenue for seeking relief. He 
was not Wholly without remedy." The Post-Conviction Remedies Act was specifically 
adopted to provide a remedy for just such an allegation as ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel. Therefore, it was unnecessary and improper for the court of appeals to improvise 
a common law remedy. 
With the promulgation of Utah's state post-conviction procedures, "the common law 
forms and procedures for extraordinary writs were abolished, in keeping with modern 
concepts of pleading and practice, but the remedies continue to be available." Renn v. Utah 
State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677,682 (Utah 1995); see also Indian Village Trading Post, 
Inc., v. Al Bench, 929 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah App. 1996). 
'The PCRA [Post-Conviction Remedies Act] replaced prior post-conviction remedies 
with a statutory, 'substantive legal remedy for any person who challenges a conviction or 
sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal remedies/" Julian v. 
12 
State, 2002 UT , H 4, 52 P.3d 1168, 451 Utah Adv. Rep. 6., quoting Utah Code Ann § 
78-35a-102. 
Most claims which formerly could have been raised in a common law petition for 
writ of error coram nobis, can now be rai- d under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. This 
does not necessarily mean that the common law writ of error coram nobis has been totally 
abolished. As the Kansas Supreme Court said: "We need not say here that under no 
circumstances is the writ [of error coram nobis] longer available under our procedure. But 
we are not now aware of a situation where adequate remedies are not provided by our 
comprehensive codes of civil and criminal procedure . . . and in addition the relief afforded 
in habeas corpus proceedings." State v. Miller, 161 Kan. 210, 216, 166 P.2d 680, 684 
(1946). 
Similarly, our courts have not held that the common-law writ of error coram nobis 
is no longer available in Utah under any circumstance. However, in a case like this, where 
a specific statutory avenue for seeking relief exists under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, 
the court of appeals erred by resorting to an ancient common law writ rather than 
acknowledging that Rees's proper avenue for relief was to file a civil petition for post-
conviction relief under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act.7 
7
 Even if a statutory remedy were not available, the common law writ of error 
coram nobis is not the proper writ to attempt to correct the type of irregularity which 
occurred in this case. The error in this case arose during appeal. "Another limitation 
upon the scope of the remedy in the nature of coram nobis is found in the rule that the 
writ or equivalent motion is never granted to relieve from circumstances arising 
subsequent to the judgment. Huffman v. Alexander, 197 Or. 283, 294, 253 P.2d 289, 342-
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II. THE COURT OF APPEALS IMPROPERLY REVERSED THE TRIAL 
COURT DECISION TO DISMISS THE PETITION. 
Rees filed a petition for extraordinary relief in the underlying criminal case. The trial 
court properly dismissed the petition because the case had already gone up on appeal. The 
court of appeals reversed the trial court and remanded with instructions that should Rees 
prevail, he be resentenced nunc pro tunc. 
A. The petition was improperly filed in the criminal case, instead of as a 
separate civil action. 
A petition following conclusion of a direct appeal is necessarily a post-conviction 
petition which must be filed as a separate civil action. Petitioner improperly filed his 
petition in the underlying criminal case, rather than as a separate civil action. Petitioner 
filed his petition as a petition for extraordinary relief under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
65B(a)(b), rather than under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act and Rule 65C. However, 
under either rule 65B or rule 65C, the petition should have been filed as civil action separate 
43 (1953), citing Collins v State, 66 Kan. 201, 71 P.251, 60 L.R.A. 572; 31 Am.Jur., 
Judgments, § 3804. 
"A writ of coram nobis seeks review of a judgment on the ground that judgment 
would not have been rendered but for mistakes of fact which were unknown to the trial 
court and the parties. State v. Woodard, 108 Utah 390, 391, 160 P.2d 432, 433 (1945). It 
"can properly be invoked only where there has been some mistake of fact which, if the 
truth had been known, would have prevented the conviction: and the failure to make 
known such fact must have been without fault or neglect on the part of the accused/' 
Valdez v State, 22 Utah 2d 306, 307, n.2, 452 P.2d 551 (Utah 1969), quoting Sullivan v 
Turner, 22 Utah 2d 35, 448 P.2d 907, 909 (1968); and see Sulaiman v United States, 
2002 WL 519718 (E.D.N.Y.) (petition for writ of error coram nobis claimed ineffective 
assistance of counsel, but coram nobis could not afford requested relief. Court treated it 
as a petition for habeas corpus). 
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from the criminal case. See Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(2) and 65C(b); See also Shunk v Fuchs. 
2000 WL 33250566, Nos. 20000192-CA, 20000193-CA (Utah App. May 4, 2000) 
(unpublished memorandum decision) (addendum H). 
Procedural provisions for filing a petition for post-conviction relief are governed by 
Rule 65Cofthe Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-102(1), and Utah 
R. Civ. P. 65C(b) & (f). A petition for post-conviction relief is a civil action which must 
be filed as a civil case separate from the underlying criminal case. Shunk v Fuchs, 2000 
WL 33250566, Nos. 20000192-CA, 20000193-CA (Utah App. May 4, 2000) (unpublished 
memorandum decision) (petition cVas filed in the underlying criminal case rather than in 
a separate civil action, as required by Rule 65C") (addendum H).8 
8
 The State argues that coram nobis is not the appropriate remedy. But even if a 
writ of coram nobis was proper, it should have been filed as a separate civil action. The 
court of appeals cites federal cases for its conclusion that coram nobis is a step in the 
criminal case and not like habeas corpus where relief is sought in a separate civil 
proceeding. Rees, 2003 UT App. 4 at f 6. However, courts have disagreed about this. 
Several Utah cases have asserted that coram nobis is a civil action. See Sullivan v 
Turner, 22 Utah 2d 85, 89, 448 P.2d 907, 910 (1968) ("Petitions in habeas corpus and 
coram nobis are generally regarded as being analogous procedurally to civil 
proceedings;'); tate v Mitchell, 569 P.2d 1117, 1118 (Utah 1977) (The writ of coram 
nobis, like habeas corpus, is civil in nature.) 
The court of appeals also cites Johnson in support of its position by referring to the 
fact that Johnson says a petition for post conviction relief should be filed in the sentencing 
court. State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981). However, this does not mean that the 
petition should be filed in the underlying criminal case. It merely means that the petition 
should be reviewed by the Judge who sentenced the defendant. Current Civil Rule 65C states 
that a civil petition for post-conviction relief "shall be commenced by filing a petition with 
the clerk of the district court in the county in which the judgment of conviction was 
entered"and that "the clerk shall promptly assign and deliver it to the judge who sentenced 
the petitioner:' Utah R. Civ. P. 65C(b) and (f). 
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B. The criminal trial court lacked jurisdiction and therefore properly 
dismissed the petition. 
Rees improperly filed his petition in the criminal case, and did so after his conviction 
had been affirmed on appeal. On May 10, 2001, the trial court dismissed the petition. In 
its minute entry, the court said: "This is time [sic] set for motion hearing on the motion for 
extraordinary relief. Hearing not held. State objects to the motion filed as the case has 
already been adjudicated in the Court of Appeals. Court dismisses the petition and finds that 
the case has been adjudicated in the Court of Appeals" (R. 128) (addendum E). Because the 
court of appeals had not remanded the case, the litigation was concluded. 
On appeal of the dismissal of the petition, the court of appeals criticized the ruling 
of the trial court: "After reviewing the petition, the trial court, in a short minute entry, 
dismissed Rees's petition as focusing solely on issues that had been previously adjudicated 
by this court. The trial court's conclusion is incorrect." Rees, 2003 UT App 4, at % 10. 
The court of appeals reads meaning into the trial court's minute entry which is not 
part of its plain language. The minute entry does not state that the trial court was dismissing 
the petition because it focused on issues that had already been raised on appeal.9 The trial 
court merely found that the case had been adjudicated in the court of appeals. The criminal 
case was complete and judgment was final. A valid sentence had been imposed, and the 
9
 Even if this were the reason the trial court dismissed the petition, die Court can 
affirm the trial court on any proper ground. See Otteson v. Dept. of Human Services, 945 
P.2d 170,172 (Utah App. 1997); Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assoc, 752 P.2d 892, 895 
(Utah 1988). 
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conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. Therefore the criminal case was closed 
and the trial court lacked jurisdiction. 
"Once a court imposes a valid sentence, it loses subject matter jurisdiction over the 
case." State v. Montoya, 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah App. 1991) (citing State v. BabbeL 813 
P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1991). As a general rule, a trial court loses jurisdiction once an appeal 
is perfected. See Saunders v. Sharp, SIS P.2d 574, 577 (Utah App. 1991); Frost v. District 
Court, 83 P.2d 737 (Utah 1938). A judgment is final following affirmance on appeal, when 
nothing is remanded for the trial court to reconsider or decide. See Schoney v. Memorial 
Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 61 (Utah App. 1993). 
On direct appeal, the court of appeals did not return Rees's case to the trial court, 
thus the criminal trial court no longer had jurisdiction to make additional rulings in the 
underlying criminal case. "When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction, it retains only 
the authority to dismiss the action." Varian-Eimac v. Lamoreaux, 161 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah 
App. 1989). See also Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT App 299, % 7, 13 P.3d 616; 
State v Palmer, 111 P.2d 521, 522 (Utah App. 1989). 
The trial court properly dismissed the petition because it lacked jurisdiction. Lack 
of jurisdiction was not specifically given as the reason for the dismissal. However, "a lack 
of jurisdiction can be raised by the court or either party at any time." A J. Mac Kay Co v. 
Okland Const. Co.,, 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991). See also Barton v. Barton, 2001 UT 
App 199, 29 P.3d 13. The State's brief to the court of appeals asserted that the petition was 
properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
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The trial court properly dismissed the petition for extraordinary relief because the 
criminal trial court did not have jurisdiction to make additional rulings in the criminal case. 
The court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court decision. 
C. The petition was improperly filed under Rule 65B instead of under 
the Post-Conviction Remedies Act and Rule 65C. 
In addition to the fact that the petition was improperly filed in the criminal case 
instead of as a separate civil action, it was also improperly filed under Rule 65B instead of 
under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act and Rule 65C. 
In his petition, Rees alleged that he was denied his right to appeal The appropriate 
avenue for seeking relief on a claim of denial of the Constitutional right to appeal, (or a 
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel), is under the Post-Conviction Remedies 
Act and Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C. Rule 65C contains the procedural provisions 
for the filing and commencement of a petition for post-conviction relief under the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act. The Act provides a substantive legal remedy for those who wish 
to "challenge a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-
102(1). 
Rule 65C "replaces former paragraph (b) of Rule 65B. It governs proceedings 
challenging a conviction or sentence . . . . Claims relating to the terms or conditions of 
confinement are governed by paragraph (b) of the Rule 65B." Utah R. Civ. P. 65C, 
Advisory Committee Note (1996). 
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The petition was filed "under the provisions of Rule 65B(a)(b)"(R. 121). However, 
Rule 65B is inapplicable because it governs the procedures for those who claim they have 
"been wrongfully restrained of personal liberty." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b) (1998); Utah R. 
Civ. P. 65B, Advisory Committee Note (1998). Rule 65B(a) states: "Where no other plain, 
speedy and adequate remedy is available, a person may petition the court for extraordinary 
relief on any of the grounds set forth in paragraph (b) (involving wrongful restraint on 
personal liberty) There shall be no special form of writ. Except for instances governed 
by Rule 65C, the procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings on all petitions for 
extraordinary relief." Because Rees had a remedy under the Act and rule 65C, current rule 
65B, by its own terms, does not apply. 
Rees's petition was improper because it was filed under Rule 65B when Rees was 
not challenging the terms or conditions of his confinement. Because of the nature of his 
petition and the relief it requested, it was more properly a petition for post-conviction relief 
under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 et seq, and Rule 
65C. "In determining the character of a motion, the substance of the motion, not its caption, 
is controlling." State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Utah App. 1994). Likewise, the 
character of a petition must be determined by its substance and the relief it seeks rather than 
by its caption. 
Rees did not challenge the terms or conditions of his confinement but instead 
challenged his conviction and sentence, claiming that he was "denied his Constitutional 
right to appeal" (addendum E). Accordingly, the petition should have been filed under the 
19 
Post-Conviction Remedies Act and Rule 65C. The trial court properly dismissed the 
petition because it was improperly filed. The court of appeals erred in reversing the trial 
court's dismissal of the petition. 
D. The court of appeals erroneously reviewed the matter as if the 
petition raised a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel when 
Rees never alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Rees's petition for extraordinary relief did not allege any claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Rather, he argued that he had been denied his right to appeal. 
Likewise, when appealing the dismissal of his petition, Rees also did not argue any claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel. Instead, he argued that the issue on appeal was whether 
"the Trial Court committed err [sic] in not considering the defendant's lack of fault in a 
procedural defect in the appeal process." (Brief at 1). Despite the fact that Rees had never 
argued or even mentioned the Sixth Amendment, his right to counsel, or ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the court of appeals created for him an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim out of whole cloth. It wrote that "while Rees's petition for extraordinary 
relief fails to articulate a clear or concise claim, our reading of the petition suggests that the 
petition is predicated on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel." State v. 
Rees, 2003 UT App 4, at f 8. 
By what authority the court believed it could reverse on this ground is unclear. Utah 
courts will not reverse based on claims of error argued for the first time on appeal. State v. 
Cram, 2002 UT 37, f9, 46 P.3d 230 ("as a general rule, claims not raised before the trial 
court may not be raised on appeal"); and see State v. Julian, 966 P.2d 249, 258 (1998) ("we 
20 
will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal"). A fortiori, they may not reverse 
on a ground never briefed or argued, even on appeal. 
This Court has frequently refused to "engage in constructing arguments out of whole 
cloth on behalf of defendants," even in capital cases. State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, |^ 125, 
63 P.2d 731 (quoting State v . Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n. 5 (Utah 1988), habeas 
corpus granted on unrelated grounds in Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991) 
cert, denied 504 U.S. 911, 112 S.Ct. 1942 (1992). Yet the court of appeals has done 
precisely that in this possession-of-marijuana case, despite the fact that, as demonstrated 
above, Rees has a clear legal remedy if he will only avail himself of it. 
III. REES IS NOT ENTITLED TO A SECOND DIRECT APPEAL FROM THE 
SAME FINAL JUDGMENT. 
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision dismissing Rees's petition, 
and remanded for further consideration. The court also ruled that if Rees is able to satisfy 
the requirements for a writ of error coram nobis, the trial court "must then grant Rees's 
petition and reenter his sentence nunc-pro-tunc." Rees, 2003 UT App. 4 at ^ 11, 15. 
Presumably, after a re-sentencing nunc pro tunc, Rees would be allowed to proceed with a 
second appeal. This relief is not appropriate or available. The court of appeals ruling would 
provide Rees with two direct appeals from the same final judgment. 
In his petition, Rees alleged that he was denied his right to appeal. However, Rees 
had an appeal. State v. Rees, 2001 UT App 27 (unpublished memorandum decision) 
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(addendum C). The petition asks for inappropriate relief, by asking that Rees be re-
sentenced and allowed to file a second direct appeal. 
The petition states: 
12. . . . the defendant has been denied his right to appeal through no fault 
of his own. 
13. The only remedy for this type of Problem is threw [sic] a Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (1981). 
(R. 123) (addendum D). 
By alleging that Rees was denied his right to appeal, the petition asserts a claim 
which is simply not true. Rees did receive an appeal. The court of appeals entered its 
decision on February 1, 2001. State v. Rees, 2001 UT App 27 (unpublished decision). 
Thus, Rees v never denied his right to appeal because he had an appeal. The claim which 
should have been raised was that Rees received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
However, Rees has never asserted a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
If a defendant has been denied his constitutional right to appeal, then nunc pro tunc 
re-sentencing, such as was provided in State v Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981), may 
be appropriate, in order to provide a defendant with a first appeal as of right. But a Johnson 
re-sentencing is only available when a defendant has been completely denied his right to 
appeal, not when a defendant has already had an appeal but alleges ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel on appeal. See State v Jiminez, 938 P.2d 264 (Utah 1997); State v 
Hallett. 856 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1993); State v Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981). This is 
because denial of counsel altogether on appeal warrants a presumption of prejudice, but an 
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allegation of mere ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal does not. Smith v Robbins, 
528 U.S. 259, 286, 120 S.Ct. 746, 764 (2000). 
'The standard forjudging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is the same as 
the standard forjudging ineffective assistance of trial counsel." Bruner v Carver, 920 P.2d 
1153, 1157 (Utah 1996). To prove ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, Rees would 
have to show that his attorney's performance was deficient, and that the deficient 
performance prejudiced him. Strickland v Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 
(1984). 
To meet the prejudice requirement, Rees would have to demonstrate that there is a 
reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In other words, that the outcome of his appeal 
would have been different - that his conviction or sentence would have been reversed on 
appeal. Smith v Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 120 S.Ct. 746) (2000) (must show a reasonable 
probability that he would have prevailed on his appeal); and see Carter v Galetka, 2001 UT 
96, f 47-48, 44 P.3d 626. 
The courts have defined a reasonable probability as "a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the reliability of the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 
S.Ct. at 2068. "The error must be such that we lose confidence in the result on appeal." 
Butterfieldv Cook, 817 P.2d 333, 336 (Utah App), cert denied &26 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). 
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Rees already had a direct appeal. He is not entitled to a second appeal from the same 
final judgment. If a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is properly raised 
in a civil petition for post-conviction relief, and the reviewing court finds that appellate 
counsel's performance was deficient and that Rees was prejudiced, (that there is a 
reasonable probability that Rees would have prevailed on appeal), the remedy would be to 
vacate the conviction or sentence, not to allow Rees a second direct appeal on the same final 
judgment because his counsel was ineffective the first time around. See Utah Code Ann § 
78-35a-108(l). 
The court of appeals erred by reversing the trial court, and remanding with 
instructions that if Rees prevails, he would be entitled to a second direct appeal from the 
same final judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The court of appeals erred by resorting to use of the ancient common law writ of 
error coram nobis when the legislature has provided a clear avenue for seeking relief under 
the Post-Conviction Remedies Act. By its holding, "the Court of Appeals has rendered a 
decision that has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings 
. . . as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power of supervision." Utah R. App 
P 46(a)(3). In addition, the court of appeals decision conflicts with decisions of this Court. 
Utah R. App. P 46(a)(2). 
The court of appeals should have affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the petition. 
It could also have pointed out that the appropriate avenue for seeking relief was a civil 
24 
petition for post-conviction relief, filed under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act and Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 65C. 
Based on the facts and arguments set forth above, the State respectfully requests that 
this Court Reverse the Court of Appeals decision. 
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proceeding, and (5) the error was of such a 
fundamental nature as to render the proceedings 
irregular and invalid Rules Civ Proc Rule 65B 
*121 H Don Sharp, Ogden, for Appellant 
Mark L Shurtleff and Erin Riley, Assistant 
Attorney General, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
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THORNE, Judge 
K 1 Troy Rees appeals from the trial court's 
dismissal of his Petition for Extraordinary Relief 
We reverse and remand 
f 2 Following our February 1, 2001 affirmance of 
Rees's criminal conviction for possession of 
marijuana with intent to distribute, see State v Rees 
2001 UT App 27, 2001 WL 311418 (affirming 
Rees's conviction based m-part upon Rees's failure 
to incorporate certain record information necessary 
to our proper review of his claim), Rees filed a 
motion to resentence and a petition for 
extraordinary relief with his sentencing court, under 
the original criminal case number In his petition 
for extraordinary relief, Rees's attorney, who has 
represented Rees throughout his trial and appeal, 
essentially asserted that Rees had lost his 
opportunity for meaningful appellate review of the 
conviction due to ineffective assistance of counsel 
[FN1] On May *122 10, 2001, the trial court 
dismissed Rees's petition for extraordinary relief as 
focused solely on issues previously adjudicated by 
this court Rees now appeals this dismissal 
FN1 While Rees's counsel failed to 
actually adopt this term, the thrust of the 
petition is found in paragraphs seven 
through ten, wherein Rees's counsel admits 
having failed to diligently supervise 
certain, possibly matenal, aspects of Rees's 
appeal 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[1] U 3 Rees's sole argument on appeal is that the 
trial court erred in dismissing his petition for 
extraordinary relief We review the trial court's 
conclusions of law for correctness and its factual 
findings for plain error See Parsons v Barnes, 871 
P 2d 516, 518 (Utah 1994) 
ANALYSIS 
I Jurisdiction 
*[ 4 In response to Rees's claim, the State argues 
that because Rees filed his petition for extraordinary 
relief as a motion before his sentencing court, and 
not as a separate civil action for post conviction 
relief under rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Copr ^ West 2003 No Claim 
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Procedure, the trial court was never properly vested 
with jurisdiction We disagree 
[2][3][4][5] 1 5 Generally, the State's position 
that a post conviction petition for extraordinarv 
relief must be filed in a separate civil action under 
rule 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
would be correct See Utah R Civ P 65C(a)-(b) 
However, in certain, very limited circumstances, a 
post conviction petition for extraordinary relief is 
properly filed under rule 65B(b) and styled as a writ 
of error coram nobis See State v Johnson 635 
P2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981) (acknowledging the 
availability of coram nobis relief under rule 65B(i), 
now rule 65B(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure), [FN2] see also United States v 
Morgan, 346 US 502, 505-06, 74 S Ct 247, 
249-50, 98 L Ed 248 (1954) (discussing the writ of 
error coram nobis, its role, and the proper 
procedure for seeking the writ) Finally, when 
interpreting a document submitted to the court, 
rather than being confined to the document's 
caption, we look to the substance of the document 
to determine its nature See Renn v Utah State Bd 
of Pardons, 904 P 2d 677, 681 (Utah 1995) ("We 
will look to the substance of the action and the 
nature of the relief sought in determining the true 
nature of the extraordinary relief requested"), 
Debry v Fid Nat Title Ins Co, 828 P 2d 520, 522 
(Utah Ct App 1992) 
FN2 While we are aware that rule 65C of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, dealing 
specifically with post conviction petitions 
for extraordinary relief, was enacted after 
State v Johnson, 635 P 2d 36 (Utah 1981) 
was decided, this fact has no impact on our 
present decision First, rule 65B(b) applies 
to post conviction petitions asserting 
claims for wrongful restraint on personal 
liberty not governed by rule 65C See Utah 
R Civ P 65B(b)(l) Second, our 
supreme court, at least obliquely, 
reaffirmed its Johnson holding, and the 
survival of coram nobis type relief, in both 
State v Jiminez, 938 P 2d 264, 265 (Utah 
1997), and State v Hallett 856 P 2d 1060, 
1062 n 2 (Utah 1993) 
[6][7][8] K 6 "The writ of error coram nobis is a 
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writ used to correct fundamental errors which 
render a criminal proceeding irregular and invalid." 
Cardall v United States, 599 F Supp. 912, 914-15 
(D Utah 1984) (footnote omitted). Coram nobis is 
a step in a criminal case, see Abel v Tinsley, 338 
F2d 514, 515 (10th Cir.1964), "and not, like 
habeas corpus where relief is sought in a separate 
case and record, the beginning of a separate civil 
proceeding." Morgan 346 U.S. at 505 n. 4, 74 
S.Ct. at 249 n. 4. Thus, a petitioner seeking relief 
through coram nobis should file the petition with 
the sentencing court. See Johnson, 635 P.2d at 38 
("The appropriate remedy in a case such as this is a 
motion for relief under Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 65B(i) [presently embodied in rule 
65B(b)], Postconviction hearings, which in this case 
should be brought in the sentencing court."). 
Finally, under our interpretation of coram nobis, a 
defendant who has been convicted and has 
exhausted his normal avenues of appeal may, under 
the principles of coram nobis, only ask the 
sentencing court to modify or vacate a judgment. 
See Johnson, 635 P 2d at 38. 
[9][10][11] U 7 "Relief under the writ of error 
coram nobis is narrow and allowed 'only under 
circumstances compelling such action to achieve 
justice.' " Cardall, 599 F.Supp. at 915 (quoting 
*\23Morgan, 346 US. at 511, 74 S.Ct. at 252). 
However, " '[t]he present-day scope of coram nobis 
is broad enough to encompass not only errors of 
fact that affect the validity or regularity of legal 
proceedings, but in addition, legal errors of a 
constitutional or fundamental proportion.' " Tillman 
v United States, 32 M.J. 962, 965 (A.C.M.R.1991) 
(quoting United States v Wickham, 474 F Supp. 
113, 116 (CDCal.1979)). Included among the 
limited number of claims that may result in relief 
being granted through petitions rooted in coram 
nobis is ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
See Johnson, 635 P 2d at 37- 38; Tillman, 32 M J. 
at 966. 
[12] 1( 8 Here, while Rees's petition for 
extraordinary relief fails to articulate a clear or 
concise claim, our readmg of the petition suggests 
that the petition is predicated on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel [FN3] 
Moreover, the sole relief Rees requests in his 
petition is resentencing nunc-pro-tunc to permit him 
an opportunity to pursue a meaningful appeal. 
Thus, based merely on the face of the petition, we 
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conclude that Rees's petition for extraordinary relief 
is best described as rooted in the ancient writ ot 
error coram nobis, and therefore, the petition was 
properly filed with Rees's sentencing court. 
FN3. We find it concerning that counsel 
representing Rees in this matter, and 
arguing that Rees's appellate counsel was 
ineffective, is the same attorney who 
represented Rees throughout his criminal 
trial and appeal. However, because our 
rules only restrict such behavior on appeal, 
see State v Garrett, 849 P 2d 578, 580 n 
3 (Utah Ct.App.1993), we cannot dismiss 
Rees's claim on this basis However, we 
urge both Rees and his counsel to review 
rule 1.7(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct concerning the 
conflict of interest implicated in allowing 
counsel to argue his own ineffectiveness. 
II. Dismissal 
f 9 Rees argues that the trial court erred m 
dismissing his claim after concluding that it had 
been previously adjudicated by this court We 
review a trial court's legal conclusions for 
correctness, and, absent a showing of clear error, we 
accept the trial court's findings of fact. See Stewart 
v State, 830 P 2d 306, 309 (Utah Ct App. 1992) 
[13] % 10 In the instant case, Rees's petition, 
submitted to his sentencing court, essentially 
asserted that his appellate counsel was ineffective 
and that therefore he has been denied his right to the 
meaningful appeal of his conviction. After 
reviewing the petition, the trial court, in a short 
minute entry, dismissed Rees's petition as focusing 
solely on issues that had been previously 
adjudicated by this court. The trial court's 
conclusion is incorrect. 
U 11 In his direct appeal, Rees presented three 
issues for our review, none of which focused on the 
effectiveness of his attorney at any level of the 
process Moreover, in the memorandum decision 
addressing Rees's direct appeal, see State v Rees 
2001 UT App 27, 2001 WL 311418. we did not 
address the issue of the effectiveness of Rees's 
appellate counsel. Because this issue has never 
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been presented to this court, nor ruled upon by this 
court, the tnal court's conclusion is incorrect as a 
matter of law Therefore, we reverse the trial court's 
decision to dismiss Rees's petition and remand this 
case for further consideration 
f 12 Because Rees's petition presents a rarely 
encountered situation-a request for extraordinary 
relief patterned after the writ of error coram 
nobis-we clarify the standard under which the tnal 
court should review the petition on remand 
[14] f 13 A writ of error coram nobis is not a 
substitute for a direct appeal See Tillman 32 M J 
at 965 Rather, coram nobis is available in "limited 
circumstances, to modify or vacate a judgment 
where extra-record facts show[ ] that the defendant 
ha[s] been deprived of his constitutional right to a 
fair trial [or meaningful appeal] " Johnson, 635 
P 2d at 38 Due to the rarity of petitions styled after 
the writ of error coram nobis in Utah, we have yet 
to articulate a clear standard under which trial 
courts should review these petitions Therefore, we 
have exammed the approach adopted by courts 
outside of Utah for assistance and conclude that the 
standard articulated by the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals is best suited to our purposes. 
*124 [15] f 14 In Hirabayashi v United States, 
828 F2d 591 (9th Cir 1987), after setting forth a 
detailed account of facts concerning the internment 
of people of Japanese ancestry during World War 
II—facts central to the petitioner's claim-the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the nature of 
coram nobis petitions and established a four-part 
test that a petitioner must satisfy before coram nobis 
type relief can be granted See id at 594-98 
These factors include a showing by the petitioner 
that (1) an error was made dunng the proceedings 
that was unknown to the petitioner at the time, (2) a 
more traditional avenue of relief is not available to 
the petitioner, (3) valid reasons exist for the failure 
to attack the error in a previous proceeding, and 
'(4) the error was of such a fundamental nature as 
to render the proceedings irregular and invalid" 
Tillman 32 M J at 965 (citing Hirabayashi 828 
F 2d at 604), see also Hale v United States, No 
99-07, 1999 WL 1087020, *2, 1999 CCA LEXIS 
303, at *6 (AFCtCrimApp Nov 9, 1999) In 
addition to these factors, we would add that the 
petitioner must also satisfy the requirements set 
forth in rule 65B and establish that the claim has 
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neither been previously adjudicated, nor is it 
frivolous on its face See Utah R Civ P 65B(b)(5) 
H 15 Thus, to succeed in his petition in the trial 
court, Rees must first make a threshold showing that 
his petition contains issues that have not been 
adjudicated previously and presents issues that are 
not frivolous on their face The tnal court must 
then determine whether (1) an error was made 
dunng Rees's appeal that was unknown to him, (2) 
no more traditional avenue of relief is available to 
Rees, (3) valid reasons exist for Rees's failure to 
attack the error in a previous proceeding, and "(4) 
the error was of such a fundamental nature as to 
render the proceedings irregular and invalid" 
Tillman 32 M J at 965 (citing " mbayashi 828 
F 2d at 604) If the tnal court P u> that Rees is 
able to satisfy each of these requirements, the court 
must then grant Rees's petition and reenter his 
sentence nunc-pro-tunc 
CONCLUSION 
\ 16 Rees's petition for extraordinary relief is 
properly filed under rule 65B(b), the successor rule 
to the writ of error coram nobis Therefore, the 
court responsible for imposing sentence on Rees for 
his underlying conviction is vested with jurisdiction 
over Rees's petition Moreover, Rees's claim, that 
he has been denied his nght to a meaningful appeal 
because of the ineffective assistance of his appellate 
counsel, was not the subject of any poor 
adjudication in this court, thus, the tnal court erred 
in dismissing Rees's petition on that basis Finally, 
should Rees prevail, the tnal court's authority is 
limited to merely resentencing Rees nunc-pro-tunc 
H 17 WE CONCUR NORMAN H JACKSON, 
Presiding Judge and JUDITH M BILLINGS, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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70-35a-lOl. Short title. 
This act shall be known as the "Post-Conviction Remedies 
Act * 1996 
78-35a-102. Replacement of prior remedies . 
(1) This chapter establishes a substantive legal remedv ror 
any person who challenges a conviction or sentence for a 
criminal offense and who has exhausted all other legal reme-
dies, including a direct appeal except as provided in Subsec-
tion (2) Procedural provisions for filing and commencement of 
a petition are found in Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure 
(2) This chapter does not apply to 
(a) habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a 
conviction or sentence for a criminal offense 
(b) motions to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule 
22(e), Utah Rules of Cnminal Procedure or 
(c\ actions takers by the Board of Pardons arvd Parole 
CHAPTER 35a 
POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES ACT 










Replacement of prior remedies 
Applicability — Effect on petitions 
Grounds for relief — Retroactivity of rule 
Burden of proof 
Preclusion of relief — Exception. 
7B-35a-103. Applicability — Effect on petitions. 
Except for the limitation period established in Section 
78-35a-107, this chapter applies only to post-conviction pro-
ceedings filed on or after July 1, 1996 iw6 
70-35a-lO4. Grounds for relief — Retroactivity of rule . 
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78-35a-106 or 78-35a 107 a 
person who has been convicted and sentenced for a criminal 
offense may file an action in the distnct court of original 
jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or modifv the 
conviction or sentence upon the following grounds 
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence vas 
imposed in violation of the United States Constitution or 
Utah Constitution, 
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that s 
in violation of the United States Constitution or Ltah 
35a-105 JUDICIAL CODE 696 
Constitution, or the conduct for which the petitioner was 
prosecuted is constitutionally protected, 
<c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, 
or probation was revoked m an unlawful manner, 
i d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel 
in violation of the United States Constitution or Utah 
Constitution or 
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that re-
quires the court to vacate the conviction or sentence, 
because 
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel 
knew of the evidence at the time of trial or sentencing 
or in time to include the evidence m any previously 
filed post-tnal motion or post-conviction proceeding, 
and the evidence could not have been discovered 
through the exercise of reasonable diligence, 
lu) the material evidence is not merely cumulative 
of evidence that was known, 
(in) the material evidence is not merely impeach-
ment evidence, and 
(IV) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly 
discovered matenal evidence demonstrates that no 
reasonable trier of fact could have found the peti-
tioner guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence 
received 
2) The question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the 
nefit of a rule announced by the United States Supreme 
>urt, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah Court of Appeals after 
e petitioner s conviction became final shall be governed by 
phcable state and federal principles of retroactivity 199S 
l-35a-105. Burden of proof. 
The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a 
eponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle 
e petitioner to relief The respondent has the burden of 
eading any ground of preclusion under Section 78-35a-106, 
it once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden 
• disprove its existence by a preponderance of the evidence 
1996 
3-35a-106- Preclusion of relief — Exception. 
(1) A person is not eligible for rehef under this chapter upon 
n> ground that 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-tnal 
motion 
ib) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal, 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on 
appeal 
id) was raised or addressed in any previous request for 
post-conviction relief or could have been, but was not, 
raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief, or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in 
Section 78-35a-107 
2) Notwithstanding Subsection (lXc), a person may be 
eligible for relief on a basis that the ground could have been 
)ut was not raised at trial or on appeal, if the failure to raise 
hat ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel 1996 
78-35a-107. Statute of limitations for post-conviction 
relief. 
(DA petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is 
filed within one year after the cause of action has accrued 
2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues 
on the latest of the following dates 
ta) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the 
final judgment of conviction, if no appeal is taken, 
ib) the entry of the decision of the appellate court 
which has jurisdiction over the case, if an appeal is taken, 
(c) the last day for filing a petition for wnt of certiorari 
in the Utah Supreme Court or the United States Supreme 
Court if no petition for wnt of certiorari is filed, 
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for wnt of 
certioran or the entry of the decision on the petition for 
certiorari review, if a petition for writ of certioran is filed 
or 
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have 
known, in the exercise of reasonable diligence of eviden-
tiary facts on which the petition is based 
(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require a 
court may excuse a petitioner s failure to file within the time 
limitations 
(4) Sections 78-12-35 and 78-12-40 do not extend the limi-
tations penod established m this section 1996 
78-35a-108. Effect of granting relief — Notice. 
(1) If the court grants the petitioner's request for relief it 
shall either 
(a) modify the onginal conviction or sentence or 
(b) vacate the onginal conviction or sentence and order 
a new tnal or sentencing proceeding as appropnate 
(2) (a) If the petitioner is serving a felony sentence the 
order shall be stayed for five days Within the stay penod 
the respondent shall give wntten notice to the court and 
the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new tnal 
or sentencing proceedings, appeal the order, or take no 
action 
(b) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives 
notice at any time during the stay penod that it intends to 
take no action, the court shall lift the stay and deliver the 
order to the custodian of the petitioner 
(c) If the respondent gives notice that it intends to retry 
or resentence the petitioner, the tnal court may order any 
supplementary orders as to arraignment, tnal , sentenc-
ing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may be 
necessary 1996 
78-35a-109. Appointment of counsel. 
(1) If any portion of the petition is not summanly dis-
missed, the court may, upon the request of an indigent 
petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis Counsel who 
represented the petitioner at tnal or on the direct appeal may 
not be appointed to represent the petitioner under this section 
(2) In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court 
shall consider the following factors 
(a) whether the petition contains factual allegations 
that will require an evidentiary hearing, and 
(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of 
law or fact that require the assistance of counsel for 
proper adjudication 
(3) An allegation that counsel appointed under this section 
was ineffective cannot be the basis for relief in any subsequent 
post-conviction petition 1996 
78-35a-110. Appeal — Jurisdiction. 
Any party may appeal from the tnal court's final judgment 
on a petition for post-conviction rehef to the appellate court 
having jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2-2 or 78-2a-3 
1996 
PART 2 
CAPITAL SENTENCE CASES 
78-35a«201. Postconviction remedies — 30 days. 
A post-conviction remedy may not be applied for or enter-
tained by any court within 30 days pnor to the date set for 
execution of a capital sentence, unless the grounds for appli-
cation are based on facts or circumstances which developed or 
first became known within that penod of time 1997 
78-35a-202. Appointment and payment of counsel in 
death penalty cases. 
( D A person who has been sentenced to death and whose 
conviction and sentence has been affirmed on appeal shall be 
UT ST RCP Rule 65C 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65C 
MICHIE'S UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
PART VIII. PROVISIONAL AND FINAL REMEDIES AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS 
Copyright ® 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current with amendments through February 20, 2002 
Rule 65C. Post-conviction relief. 
(a) Scope. This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for post-
conviction relief filed under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 et seq., Post-
Conviction Remedies Act. 
(b) Commencement and venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a 
petition with the clerk of the district court in the county in which the judgment 
of conviction was entered. The petition should be filed on forms provided by the 
court. The court may order a change of venue on its own motion if the petition is 
filed in the wrong county. The court may order a change of venue on motion of a 
party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses. 
(c) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the 
petitioner has in relation to the legality of the conviction or sentence. 
Additional claims relating to the legality of the conviction or sentence may not 
be raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The petition 
shall state: 
(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of 
incarceration; 
(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced 
and the dates of proceedings in which the conviction was entered, together with 
the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the petitioner; 
(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the 
petitioner's claim to relief; 
4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for 
violation of probation has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and 
title of the appellate proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the results of 
the appeal; 
(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in 
any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and, if so, the case number 
and title of those proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the results 
of the prior proceeding; and 
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(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered 
evidence, the reasons why the evidence could not have been discovered in time for 
the claim to be addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous post-
conviction petition. 
(d) Attachments to the petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner 
shall attach to the petition: 
(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the 
allegations; 
(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court 
regarding the direct appeal of the petitioner's case; 
(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-
conviction or other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the 
conviction or sentence; and 
(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court. 
(e) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or 
citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a 
separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the petition. 
(f) Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign 
and deliver it to the judge who sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who 
sentenced the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case in the 
normal course. 
(g)(1) Summary dismissal of claims. The assigned judge s hall review the 
petition, and, if it is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated 
in a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its 
face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating 
either that the claim has been adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its 
face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim 
shall terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal 
need not recite findings of fact or conclusions of law. 
(2) A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations 
contained in the pleadings and attachments, it appears that: 
(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law; 
(B) the claims have no arguable basis in fact; or 
(C) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired prior 
to the filing of the petition. 
(3) If a petition is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a 
pleading error or failure to comply with the requirements of this rule, the court 
snail return a copy of the petition with leave to amend within 20 days. The court 
may grant one additional 20 day period to amend for good cause shown. 
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M ) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-
conviction petition in a case where the petitioner is sentenced to death. 
in) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes 
that all or part of the petition should not be summarily dismissed, the court 
shall designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the 
clerk to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and memorandum by mail upon the 
respondent. If the petition is a challenge to a felony conviction or sentence, the 
respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney General. In all other 
cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner. 
(i) Answer or other response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these 
rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the 
respondent, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the 
respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition that 
have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response upon the 
petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days iplus time allowed for 
service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, 
the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the motion. No further pleadings or 
amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the court. 
(3) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the 
proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. The court may also 
order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay 
unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition. At the prehearing 
conference, the court may: 
(1) consider the formation and simplification of issues; 
(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and 
(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to 
be presented at the evidentiary hearing. 
(k) Presence of the petitioner at hearings. The petitioner shall be present at 
the prehearing conference if the petitioner is not represented by counsel. The 
prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or video 
conferencing. The petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on 
dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in court during the 
proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility vvhere 
the petitioner is confined. 
(1) Discovery; records. Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed by 
the court upon motion of a party and a determination that there is good cause to 
believe that discovery is necessary to provide a party with evidence that is 
likely to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. The court may order either the 
petitioner or the respondent to obtain any relevant transcript or court records. 
^mj Orders; stay. 
(1) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and an appropriate order. If the 
petitioner is serving a sentence for a felony conviction, the order shall be 
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stayed for 5 days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written 
notice to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new 
trial, pursue a new sentence, appeal the order, or take no action. Thereafter the 
stay of the order is governed by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action 
will be tarcen, the stay shall expire and the court shall deliver forthwith to the 
custodian of the petitioner the order to release the petitioner. 
(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or 
resentenced, the trial court may enter any supplementary orders as to arraignment, 
trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may be 
necessary and proper. 
'n) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under 
Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. If the petitioner is indigent, 
the court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental entity that 
prosecuted the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody of the Department 
of Corrections, Section 64-13-23 and sections 21-7-3 through 21-7- 4.7 govern the 
manner and procedure by which the trial court shall determine the amount, if any, 
to charge for fees and costs. 
(o) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be 
appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah in 
accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts. 
fAdded effective July 1, 1996.) 
Rules Civ. P r o c , Rule 65C 
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Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief. 
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is 
available, a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief on any of the 
grounds set forth in paragraph (b) (involving wrongful restraint on personal 
liberty), paragraph (c) (involving the wrongful use of public or corporate 
authority) or paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of judicial authority, the 
failure to exercise such authority, and actions by the Board of Pardons and 
Parole). There shall be no special form of writ. Except for instances governed by 
Rule 65C, the procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings on all petitions 
for extraordinary relief. To the extent that this rule does not provide special 
procedures, proceedings on petitions for extraordinary relief shall be governed by 
the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules. 
(b) Wrongful restraints on personal liberty. 
(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by Rule 65C, this paragraph shall 
govern all petitions claiming that a person has been wrongfully restrained of 
personal liberty, and the court may grant relief appropriate under this paragraph. 
(2) Commencement. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with 
the clerk of the court in the district in which the petitioner is restrained or 
the respondent resides or in which the alleged restraint is occurring. 
(3) Contents of the petition and attachments. The petition shall contain a 
short, plain statement of the facts on the basis of which the petitioner seeks 
relief. It shall identify the respondent and the place where the person is 
restrained. It shall state the cause or pretense of the restraint, if Known by the 
petitioner. It shall state whether the legality of the restraint nas already oeen 
adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so, the reasons for the denial of relief 
in the prior proceeding. The petitioner shall attach to the petition any legal 
process available to the petitioner that resulted in restraint. The petitioner 
shall also attach to the petition a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner 
in any prior proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the restraint. 
M ) Memorardum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or 
citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a 
separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the petition. 
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(5) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is apparent 
to the court that the legality of the restraint has already been adjudicated in a 
prior proceeding, or if for any other reason any claim in the petition shall 
appear frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing 
the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on its face and the reasons for 
this conclusion. The order need not state findings of fact or conclusions of law. 
The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall 
terminate ^ith the entry of the order of dismissal. 
(6) Responsive pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed as being frivolous on 
its face, the court shall direct the clerk of the court to serve a copy of the 
petition and a copy of any memorandum upon the respondent by mail. At the same 
time, the court may issue an order directing the respondent to answer or otherwise 
respond to the petition, specifying a time within which the respondent must 
comply. If the circumstances require, the court may also issue an order directing 
the respondent to appear before the court for a hearing on the legality of the 
restraint. An answer to a petition shall state plainly whether the respondent has 
restrained the person alleged to have been restrained, whether the person so 
restrained has been transferred to any other person, and if so, the identity of 
the transferee, the date of the transfer, and the reason or authority for the 
transfer. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to prohibit the court from 
ruling upon the petition based upon a dispositive motion. 
(7) Temporary relief. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained 
will be removed from the court's jurisdiction or will suffer irreparable injury 
before compliance with the hearing order can be enforced, the court shall issue a 
warrant directing the sheriff to bring the respondent before the court to be dealt 
with according to law. Pending a determination of the petition, the court may 
place the person alleged to have been restrained in the custody of such other 
persons as may be appropriate. 
(8) Alternative service of the hearing order. If the respondent cannot be found, 
or if it appears that a person other than the respondent has custody of the person 
alleged to be restrained, the hearing order and any other process issued by the 
court may be served on the person having custody in the manner and with the same 
effect as if that person had been named as respondent in the action. 
(9) Avoidance of service by respondent. If anyone having custody of the person 
alleged to be restrained avoids service of the hearing order or attempts 
wrongfully to remove the person from the court's jurisdiction, the sheriff shall 
immediately arrest the responsible person. The sheriff shall forthwith bring the 
person arrested before the court to be dealt with according to law. 
(10) Hearing or other proceedings. In the event that the court orders a hearing, 
the court shall hear the matter in a summary fashion and shall render judgment 
accordingly. The respondent or other person having custody shall appear with the 
person alleged to be restrained or shall state the reasons for failing to do so. 
The court may nevertheless direct the respondent to bring before it the person 
alleged to be restrained. If the petitioner waives the right to be present at the 
hearing, tne court shall modify the hearing order accordingly. The hearing order 
shall not be disobeyed for any defect of form or any misdescription in the order 
or the petition, if enough is stated to impart the meaning and intent of the 
proceeding to the respondent. 
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(c) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authority. 
(1) Who may petition the court; security. The attorney general rray, and <vhen 
directed to do so by the governor shall, petition the court for relief on the 
grounds enumerated in this paragraph. Any oerson who is not required to be 
represented by the attorney general and who is aggrieved or threatened by one cf 
the acts enumerated in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph may petition the court 
under this paragraph if (A) the person claims to be entitled to an office 
unlawfully held by another or (B) if the attorney general fails to file a petition 
under this paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A petition 
filed by a person other than the attorney general under this paragraph shall be 
brought in the name of the petitioner, and the petition shall be accompanied by an 
undertaking with sufficient sureties to pay any judgment for costs and damages 
that may be recovered against the petitioner in the proceeding. The sureties shall 
be in the form for bonds on appeal provided for in Rule 73. 
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where a person 
usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, whether 
civil or military, a franchise, or an office in a corporation created by the 
authority of the state of Utah; (B) where a public officer does or permits any act 
that results in a forfeiture of the office; (C) where persons act as a corporation 
in the state of Utah without being legally incorporated; (D) where any corporation 
has violated the laws of the state of Utah relating to the creation, alteration or 
renewal of corporations; or (E) where any corporation has forfeited or misused its 
corporate rights, privileges or franchises. 
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may 
require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or 
may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on 
the merits. The court may also grant temporary relief in accordance with the terms 
of Rule 65A. 
(d) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty; actions 
by board of pardons and parole. 
(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are threatened by 
any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph may petition the court for relief. 
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an inferior 
court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial functions has 
exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior court, 
administrative agency, corporation or person has failea to perform an act required 
by law as a duty of office, trust or station; (C) where an inferior court, 
administrative agency, corporation or person has refused the petitioner the use or 
enjoyment of a right or office to which the petitioner is entitled; or (D) where 
the Board of Pardons and Parole has exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to perform 
an act required by constitutional or statutory law. 
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may 
require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or 
may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on 
the merits. The court may direct the inferior court, administrative agency, 
officer, corporation or other person named as respondent to deliver to the court a 
Copr e West 2003 No Claim to Ong U S Govt Works 
httpV/pnnt.westlaw com/deliverv.html?dest=atnAHataiH=ROOSSRnononn^7^zinnno 1 4Q*Q 1 1 /1 7 H A A ^ 
UT ST RCP Rule 65B 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 65B 
Page 4 
transcript or other record of the proceedings. The court may also grant temporary 
relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 65A. 
(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in nature, 
the court's review shall not extend further than to determine whether the 
respondent has regularly pursued its authority. 
(Amended effective September 1, 1991; May 1, 1993; July 1, 1996.) 
Rules Civ. Proc, Rule 65B 
UT ST RCP Rule 65B 
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Foundation of jurisdiction of court of 
equity to issue injunction to restrain 
trespass on real property was probability 
of irreparable injury, inadequacy of pe-
cuniary compensation, and prevention of 
multiplicity of suits where rights of 
numerous persons would be involved. Mc 
Gregor v Silver King Min. Co , 14 U. 47, 
45 P 1091, 60 Am. St, Rep. 883. 
Before court would grant injunction be-
cause of trespass already committed, there 
had to be a finding of some fact tending 
to show probability that defendant would 
again commit a trespass upon plaintiff's 
land Anderson v. Jensen, 71 U. 295, 265 
P 745. 
Power of court. 
Provision similar to subd. (1) was not 
designed to deprive the courts of any part 
of that jurisdiction with respect to m 
junctions recognized by equity; the com 
mission or the continuance of the act 
could be restrained, and the district courts 
had the power, m proper cases, to issue 
mandatory as well as preventive injunc 
tions. Injunctions could be granted to 
restore rights that had been lost, as well 
as to prevent future injuries Henderson 
v Ogden City Ry. Co., 7 U. 199, 26 P. 286 
Showing of injury and damage. 
In order to successfully maintain in-
junction proceeding, it had to appear that 
acts of those sued caused injury, and that, 
if such acts were continued, damage would 
follow. West Point Irr. Co. v. Moroni & 




(a) Special Forms of Writs Abolished. Special forms of pleadings 
and of writs in habeas corpus, mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, pro-
hibition, and other extraordinary writs, as heretofore known, are hereby 
abolished. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy exists, 
relief may be obtained by appropriate action under these Rules, on any 
one of the grounds set forth in subdivisions (b) and (f) of this Rule 
Compiler's Notes. 
There is no Fed. Rule covering this sub-
ject matter. 
Extraordinary writ. 
An extraordinary writ is not a proceed-
ing for general review and cannot be used 
as such, where the court below had juris-
diction of the parties and the subject mat 
tert there was a right of appeal that was, 
if timely used, an adequate remedy at law 
and fact that petitioner allowed that right 
of appeal to expire does not entitle him 
to seek a writ of prohibition claiming 
error Anderson v. Baker, 5 U. (2d) 33, 
296 P. 2d 283. 
(b) Grounds for Belief. Appropriate relief may be granted: 
(1) Where any person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or 
exercises a public office, civil or military, or a franchise, or an office in 
a corporation created by the authority of this state; or any public officer, 
civil or military, does or permits to be done any act which by the 
provisions of law works a forfeiture of his office; or an association of 
persons act as a corporation within this state without being legally 
incorporated; or any corporation has offended against any provision of 
the law, as it may have been amended, by or under which law such 
corporation was created, altered or renewed; or any corporation has 
forfeited its privileges and franchises by nonuser or has committed an act 
amounting to a surrender or a forfeiture of its corporate rights, privileges 
and franchises or has misused a franchise or privilege conferred upon it 
by law, or exercised a franchise or privilege not so conferred; or 
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trial had same authority as other judge 
to vacate former order, was not in excess 
of jurisdiction and did not warrant is-
suance of writ of prohibition. Ordinarily, 
failure to observe meticulous propriety 
did not go to jurisdiction of court so 
its to warrant writ of prohibition. Smith 
v. District Court of Second Judicial Dis-
trict in and for Morgan County, 69 IT. 
493, 256 P. 539. 
Applicant for writ had to show that 
tribunal sought to be restrained was act-
ing without, or in excess of, jurisdiction. 
Construction Securities Co. v. District 
Court of Third Judicial Dist. in and for 
Salt Lake County, 85 U. 346, 39 P. 2d 707. 
Writ of prohibition issued to restrain 
district court from proceeding with in-
quisition of insanity of defendant con-
demned to death since court had no juris-
diction to suspend death sentence. State 
ox rel. Johnson v. Alexander, 87 U. 376, 
4!) P. 2d 408. 
Writ preventive rather than remedial. 
The writ of prohibition was preventive, 
and not remedial, in its nature, and 
therefore was the appropriate writ to ar-
rest the unauthorized proceeding prior to 
the judgment, as well as after it, always, 
however, looking to. the future and not 
to the past. People ex rel. Pierce v. Car-
rington, 5 U. 531, 17 P. 735. 
The writ of prohibition was preventive 
rather than corrective, and issued only 
to prevent the commission of a future act, 
not to undo one already performed. It 
commanded a person to whom it was di-
rected not to do something which, by the 
suggestion of the relator, the court was 
informed he was about to do. Martineau 
v. Crabbe, 46 U. 327, 150 P. 301; Sheriff 
of Salt Lake County v. Board of Comrs. 
of Salt Lake County, 71 U. 593, 268 P. 
783. 
(c) Action by Attorney General Under Subdivision (b) (1) of this 
Rule. The attorney general may, and when directed so to do by the 
governor shall, commence any action authorized by the provisions of 
subdivision (b) (1) of this Rule. Such action shall be brought in the 
name of the State of Utah. 
Compiler's Notes. 
There is no Fed. Rule covering the sub-
ject matter contained in this Rule. 
Removal of officer for malfeasance. 
Section 77-7-2 expressly authorizes the 
district attorney to bring an action under 
chapter 7 of Title 77 and this specific 
provision makes the general rules con-
tained in Rules 65B(b)(l) and 65B(c) 
clearly inapplicable to an action to re-
move a city commissioner for malfeasance 
in office. State v. Geurts, 11 U. (2d) 345, 
359 P. 2d 12, distinguished in 17 U. (2d) 
190, 192, 407 P. 2d 571, 572. 
CoUateral References. 
Quo Warranto<S=>31, 33, 36. 
74 C.J.S. Quo Warranto § 27. 
65 Am. Jur. 2d 272 to 274, Quo War-
ranto §§ 61, 62. 
Assertion of immunity as ground for 
removing or discharging public officer or 
employee, 44 A. L. R. 2d 789. 
Conviction under federal law or law of 
another state or country, effect of on 
right to vote or hold public office, 39 A. 
L. R. 3d 303. 
Conviction: what constitutes conviction 
within statutory or constitutional provi-
sion making conviction of crime ground 
of disqualification for public office, 71 A. 
L, R. 2d 593. 
Corporation as necessary or proper party 
defendant in proceedings to determine 
validity of election or appointment of 
corporate director or officer, 21 A. L. R. 
2d 1048. 
Incompatibility, under common-law doc-
trine, of office of state legislator and posi-
tion or post in local political subdivision, 
89 A. L. R. 2d 632. 
Infamous crime or one involving moral 
turpitude constituting disqualification to 
hold public office, 52 A. L. R. 2d 1314. 
Judge, power of court to remove or sus-
pend, 53 A. L. R. 3d 882. 
Misconduct during previous office, re-
moval of public officer for, 42 A. L, R. 3d 
691. 
Offense under federal law or law of an-
other state or country, conviction as va-
cating accused's holding of state or local 
office or as ground of removal, 20 A. L. R. 
2d 732. 
Power of district, county, or prosecut-
ing attorney to bring action of quo war-
ranto, 131 A. L. R. 1207. 
Previous tenure of office, construction 
and effect of constitutional or statutory 
provisions disqualifying one for public 
office because of, 59 A. L. R. 2d 716. 
Quo warranto as remedy in field of 
taxation, 109 A. L. R. 324. 
Residency: validity of requirement that 
candidate or public officer have been resi-
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dent of governmental unit for specified 
period, 65 A. L. R. 3d 1048. 
Right of corporation to act as relator 
in information in the nature of quo war-
ranto, 1 A. L. R. 197. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Refusal of attorney general to bring ac-
tion. 
One having special interest could re-
quest attorney general to bring an action 
of quo warranto upon his relation, and if 
attorney general refused to do so, re-
spondent could then invoke aid of court, 
and if he could show that he had a special 
interest to protect, court could order at-
torney general to bring action upon his 
relation. State ex rel. Murdock v. Ryan, 
41 U. 327, 125 P. 
Right to file information without leave of 
court. 
Government officer had right, where 
proceedings were instituted without any 
relator, to file information without leave 
of court, but he could not prevent court 
from assuming jurisdiction by refusing to 
consent to use of his name when a private 
citizen was relator. State ex rel. Lloyd v 
Elliott, 13 U. 200, 44 P. 248. 
(d) Action by Private Person Under Subdivision (b) (1) of this Rule, 
A person claiming to be entitled to a public or private office unlawfully 
held and exercised by another may bring an action therefor. A private 
person may bring an action upon any other ground set forth in subdivision 
(b) (1) of this Rule, only if the attorney general fails to do so after 
notice. Any such action commenced by a private person shall be brought 
in his own name. Upon filing the complaint, such person shall also file 
an undertaking with sufficient sureties, in the same form required of 
bonds on appeal under the provision of Rule 73 and conditioned that 
such person will pay any judgment for costs or damages recovered against 
him in such action. 
Compiler's Notes. 
There is no Fed. Eule covering the sub-
ject matter contained in this Rule. 
Collateral References. 
Quo Warranto<§»34. 
74 C.J.S. Quo Warranto § 28. 
65 Am. Jur. 2d 274, Quo Warranto § 64. 
Bonds: taxable costs and disbursements 
as including expenses for bonds incident 
to steps taken in action, 90 A. L. R. 2d 
448. 
Default or consent judgment against 
principal, conclusiveness and effect, upon 
surety, of, 59 A. L. E. 2d 752. 
Parties: corporation as necessary or 
proper party defendant in proceedings to 
determine validity of election or appoint-
ment of corporate director or officer, 21 
A. L. R. 2d 1048. 
Quo warranto: right of private person 
not claiming office to maintain quo war-
ranto proceedings to test title to or ex-
istence of public office, 51 A. L. B. 2d 
1306. 
Sale of shares: validity of agreement 
in conjunction with sale of corporate 
shares that majority of directors will be 
replaced by purchaser's designees, 13 A. 
L. R. 3d 361. 
T a x p a y e r s ' a c t i o n , constitutionality 
construction, and application of statutes 
requiring bond or security for costs and 
expenses in, 89 A. L. R. 2d 333. 
Unsuccessful litigant's payment of costs 
as barring his right to appeal from judg-
ment on merits, 39 A. L. R. 2d 194. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Action by private person. 
The only condition under which private 
person could bring action in nature of quo 
warranto in name of the state was when 
another. In that case he showed some 
special interest. A citizen could not inter-
fere with state agencies without sho^D{[ 
that he had some special interest whicfi 
he was claiming to be entitled to a public required protection. State ex rel. Muraoc 
office unlawfully held and exercised by v. Ryan, 41 U. 327, 125 P. 666. 
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(e) Nature and Extent of Relief Under Subdivision (b) (2) of this 
Rule. Upon the filing of a complaint seeking relief under subdivision 
(b) (2) of this Rule, the court may require notice to be given to the 
adverse party before issuance of the writ, or may grant an order to show 
cause why such writ should not be issued, or may grant the writ without 
notice. If the writ is granted, it shall be directed to the inferior tribunal, 
board, or officer, or to any other person having the custody of the record 
or proceedings, commanding such tribunal, board or officer to certify fully 
to the court issuing the writ, within a specified time, a transcript of the 
record and proceedings, describing or referring to them with sufficient 
certainty; and if a stay of proceedings is intended, requiring the party 
in the meantime to desist from further proceedings in the matter to be 
reviewed. The review by the court issuing the writ shall not be extended 
further than to determine whether the inferior tribunal, board or officer 
has regularly pursued the authority of such tribunal, board or officer. 
Compiler's Notes. 
There is no Fed. Rule covering the sub-
ject matter contained in this Rule. 
Scope of review. 
Ordinarily on writ of review the certi-
fied record alone is examinable. This is 
not true however, where the record and 
determination of the commission or board 
are unsupported by some kind of reason-
ably substantial proof. In such event the 
judiciary may awaken to question their 
warrant, and in doing so, may receive, 
examine and weigh evidence, if necessary 
to the end that due process guarantees 
will maintain. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co. 
v. Central Weber Sewer Improvement 
Dist., 4 U. (2d) 105, 287 P. 2d 884. 
The nature and extent of the review 
depends on what happened below as re-
flected by a true record of the proceed-
ings, viewed in the light of accepted due 
process requirements. If the record made 
revealed that the commission had con-
ducted a hearing, taken evidence, heard 
witnesses under oath and otherwise had 
proceeded in accordance with such due 
process requirements, and had the facts 
either supported or negatived the com-
mission's findings and conclusions, the re-
viewing court could have examined only 
the record before it, to determine if the 
commission regularly had pursued its au-
thority, or had abused its discretion. Den-
ver & R. G. W. R. Co. v. Central Weber 
Contents and sufficiency of affidavit. 
In certiorari to review action of a jus-
tice for failure to fix a date for the trial 
and notify the parties thereof, the affi-
davit for the writ should have averred 
that the justice proceeded to trial with-
Sewer Improvement Dist., 4 U. (2d) 105, 
287 P. 2d 884. 
Collateral References. 
Quo Warranto^»46 et seq. 
74 C.J.S. Quo Warranto § 36 et seq. 
65 Am. Jur. 2d 292 et seq., Quo War-
ranto § 86 et seq. 
Administrative decision, effect of court 
review of, 79 A. L. R. 2d 1141. 
Arbitration: disqualification of arbi-
trator by court or stay of arbitration pro-
ceedings prior to award, on ground of in-
terest, bias, prejudice, collusion, or fraud 
of arbitrators, 65 A. L. R. 2d 755. 
Continuance in case before quasi-judi-
cial officer or board, counsel's absence be-
cause of attendance on legislature as 
ground for, 49 A. L. R. 2d 1073. 
Reopening decision: power of adminis-
trative agency to reopen and reconsider 
final decision as affected by lack of spe-
cific statutory authority, 73 A. L. R. 2d 
939. 
Stare decisis doctrine as applicable to 
decisions of administrative agencies, 79 A. 
L. R. 2d 1126. 
State, or its agency or board, liability 
of for costs of appeal in civil action to 
which it is a party, 72 A. L. R. 2d 1379. 
Stay of civil proceedings sending deter-
mination of action in fe al court in 
same state, 56 A. L. R. 2d jJ-3. 
out fixing the day of trial and notifying 
the parties thereof; where affidavit merely 
stated that justice in rendering judgment 
exceeded his jurisdiction, without specify-
ing in what particular he did so, it stated 
a mere conclusion and the proceedings 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
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of jurisdiction. Such rulings were review-
able by appeal. Herald-Republican Pub-
lishing Co. v. Lewis, 42 U. 188, 129 P. 
624, following Rohwer v. District Court 
of First Judicial Dist., 41 U. 279, 125 P. 
671. 
Supreme Court could not, on certiorari, 
examine trial court's findings to deter-
mine whether such findings supported the 
decree or judgment. Pincock v. Kimball, 
64 IT. 4, 228 P. 221. 
Writ of review extended no further 
than to determine whether the inferior 
court or tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction 
by want of jurisdiction of the parties or 
of the subject matter. Pincock v. Kim-
ball, 64 IT. 4, 228 P. 221, overruling Gil-
bert v. Board of Police & Fire Comrs. of 
Salt Lake City, 11 U. 378, 40 P. 264, and 
Salt Lake City Water & Electrical Power 
Co. v. City of Salt Lake City, 24 IT. 282, 
67 P. 791. 
In certiorari proceeding to review order 
releasing property from attachment, Su-
preme Court could not determine whether 
property was that of defendant or his 
wife or whether such property was exempt 
from attachment. Hilton Bros. Motor Co. 
v. District Court in and for Millard Coun-
ty, 82 IT. 372, 25 P. 2d 595. 
Where application for writ of prohibi-
tion was treated as an application for writ 
of certiorari or writ of review, court was 
limited to a determination whether there 
had been a failure or excess of jurisdic-
tion, just as in case of an application for 
a writ of prohibition. State ex rel. Well-
ing v. Third Judicial District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, 87 U. 416, 49 
P. 2d 950. 
Discretion of trial court to entertain a 
motion or application for a new trial in 
furtherance of justice, made within a rea-
sonable time and before expiration of six 
months, would not be disturbed in cer-
tiorari. Lund v. Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, 90 U. 
433, 62 P. 2d 278. 
On writ of certiorari Supremo Court 
would not consider claims not made below 
with respect to insufficiency of perfection 
of appeal from justice court to district 
court. Function of writ was to review 
question of whether inferior tribunal acted 
without or in excess of its jurisdiction; 
it would not issue to review mere error. 
State v. Salmon, 90 TT. 512, 62 P. 2d 1315. 
Fact that unauthorized person repre-
sented the state in prosecution before jus-
tice of the peace was a mere error which 
could not properly be reviewed in a cer-
tiorari proceeding. State v. Salmon, 90 
IT. 512, 62 P. 2d 1315. 
Defense of statute of limitations could 
not be raised for the first time in the 
Supreme Court on review by certiorari of 
workmen's compensation award. Ogden 
City Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 92 IT. 
423, 69 P. 2d 261. 
(f) Habeas Corpus. Appropriate relief by habeas corpus proceedings 
shall be granted whenever it appears to the proper court that any person 
is unjustly imprisoned or otherwise restrained of his liberty. If the person 
seeking relief is imprisoned in the penitentiary and asserts that in the 
proceedings which resulted in his conviction there was a substantial denial 
of his rights under the Constitution of the United States or under the 
Constitution of the State of Utah, or both, then the person seeking such 
relief shall proceed in accordance with Rule 65B(i). In all other cases, 
proceedings under this subdivision shall be conducted in accordance with 
the following provisions: 
Compiler's Notes. 
The introductory paragraph of Rule 
65B(f) was amended by the Supreme 
Court effective August 20, 1969. Prior to 
amendment the paragraph read: "Appro-
priate relief shall also be granted when-
ever it appears to the proper court that 
any person is unjustly imprisoned or re-
strained of his liberty. Proceedings under 
this subdivision shall be subject to the 
following conditions." Subdivisions (1) 
through (8) remain the same. 
Federal Rule 81(a)(2) applies the Fed. 
Rules to proceedings for habeas corpus. 
There is no Fed. Rule covering the sub-
ject matter contained in Rule 65B(f) ex-
cept as described following subds. (3) and 
(7) below. 
Burden of proof. 
Burden was on convicted plaintiff in 
habeas corpus proceeding to show that he 
was improperly detained, since after con-
viction the presumption changes in favor 
of the regularity of the proceedings and 
the judgment. Larrabee v. Turner, 25 U. 
(2d) 248, 480 P. 2d 134. 
Purpose and office of writ. 
Habeas corpus is not to be used to re-
357 
PROVISIONAL AND FINAL REMEDIES R u l e 6 5 B ( f ) ( 1 ) 
service as having been obtained by fraud 
or trickery, 98 A. L. R. 2d 600. 
Sexual psychopaths, habeas corpus to 
test validity of confinement under statutes 
relating to, 24 A. L. R. 2d 376. 
Speedy trial: waiver or loss of accused's 
right to speedy trial as affecting right to 
habeas corpus, 57 A. L. R. 2d 339. 
Subsequent proceedings: discharge on 
habeas corpus of one held in extradition 
proceedings as precluding subsequent ex-
trndifrion proceedings, 33 A. L. R. 3d 1443. 
Sufficiency of indictment or information 
as regards the offense sought to be 
charged, habeas corpus to test, 57 A. L. R. 
85. 
Law Reviews. 
Post Conviction Procedure Act: Limi-
tation on Habeus Corpus! 1969 Utah L. 
Rev. 595. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Nature of proceeding. 
Habeas corpus proceedings were civil, 
and not criminal. Winnovich v. Emery, 33 
U. 345, 93 P. 988; State v. Kelsey, 64 
U. 377, 231 P. 122. 
Habeas corpus proceeding was special 
proceeding. Winnovich v. Emery, 33 U. 
345, 93 P. 988. 
Proceeding in habeas corpus was civil; 
applicant was plaintiff and party who re-
strained applicant was the defendant, and 
appeal by defendant was not attempted 
appeal by state. Winnovich v. Emery, 33 
U. 345, 93 P. 988. 
(1) The complaint seeking relief shall, among other things, state that 
the person designated is illegally restrained of his liberty by the defendant 
and the place where he is so restrained, if known (stating wherein and 
the cause or pretense thereof, according to the best information of the 
plaintiff, annexing a copy of any legal process or giving a satisfactory 
explanation for failing so to do); that the legality of the imprisonment 
or restraint has not already been adjudged upon a prior proceeding; 
whether another complaint for the same relief has been filed and relief 
thereunder denied by any court, and if so attaching a copy of such 
complaint and stating the reasons for the denial of relief or giving satis-
factory reasons for the failure to do so. 
Custody of children. 
A natural mother was entitled to have 
her children restored to her where she had 
not given legal consent to an adoption, 
and had notified the adoptive parents that 
she wished to retake the children in ac-
cordance with the parties1 oral agreement, 
as soon as she had regained her health, 
where the adoptive parents ignored her 
request and a month later procured a pur-
ported final adoption decree without no-
tice to the natural mother, and where the 
natural mother promptly thereafter filed 
an affidavit stating under what circum-
stances the children had been obtained, 
and, within six weeks from the time the 
decree was signed, sued out an order for 
a writ of habeas corpus. Taylor v. Wad-
doups, 121 U. 279, 241 P. 2d 157. 
Extradition. 
Plaintiff was entitled to release in ha-
beas corpus proceedings prior to execution 
of extradition, since Utah did not produce 
any means of identifying him except his 
first and last name, and it was alleged 
that there was at least four persons in the 
Salt Lake area with the same first and 
last names. Madsen v. Larsen, 527 P. 2d 
227. 
Habeas corpus in general. 
Habeas corpus will not lie for the re-
lease of a prisoner because at his trial the 
verdict was received by a judge other 
than the one who had presided over the 
preceding stages of the trial. Any error, 
if committed, did not go to the jurisdic-
tion of the court or render the judgment 
void. Forrest v. Graham, 123 U. 591, 261 
P. 2d 169. 
Purpose of Eule. 
The obvious purpose of this Eule is to 
discourage successive applications based 
upon the same grounds and that the 
courts need not entertain them. Burleigh 
v. Turner, 15 U. (2d) 118, 388 P. 2d 412. 
Res judicata. 
The doctrine of res judicata is appli-
cable to habeas corpus proceedings under 
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corpus proceeding was legality of the re-
straint, where such proceedings were 
brought for custody of children, inquiry 
extended far beyond the ordinary inquiry, 
9ince proceeding was one which was equit-
able in highest degree. Jones v. Moore, 61 
U. 383, 213 P. 191. 
Writ was available to parent to obtain 
discharge of child held in custody of 
probation officer as juvenile delinquent in 
irregular proceedings beyond jurisdiction 
of juvenile court. Cooke v. Cooke, 67 U. 
371, 248 P. 83. 
In habeas corpus proceeding it was held 
that father of four-year-old child whose 
mother died at birth was entitled to 
custody as against persons with whom he 
had boarded it, though he had no home 
of his own, he being morally fit and able 
to provide for child in town where he 
worked, and thus have companionship of 
growing child. Sherry v. Doyle, 68 U. 74, 
249 P. 250, 48 A. L. R. 131. 
Purpose and office of writ 
Mere errors of construction or judg-
ment, whether committed by court or by 
some board or officer, could not be re-
viewed in habeas corpus proceeding. Bleon 
v. Emery, 60 U. 582, 209 P. 627. 
Habeas <*orpus took cognizance only of 
defects of a jurisdictional character which 
rendered proceedings not merely voidable, 
but void, so that question of sufficiency of 
complaint in proceeding to place person 
under security to keep peace could not be 
inquired into in habeas corpus proceeding. 
Areson v. Pincock, 62 U. 527, 220 P. 503. 
Right to discharge. 
If judgment or order committing peti-
tioner was beyond the court's jurisdiction 
and not mere error or irregularity, he was 
entitled to absolute discharge on habeas 
corpus. Frankey v. Patten, 75 U. 231, 
284 P. 318. 
Substitute for appeal. 
Writ could not be made to serve pur-
poses of appeal. Ex parte Hays, 15 U. 77, 
47 P. 612. 
After trial and conviction, sufficiency 
of the complaint could not be reviewed on 
habeas corpus for mere errors and irregu-
larities; this had to be done by appeal. 
Habeas corpus took cognizance only of 
defects of a jurisdictional character. Bruce 
v. East, 43 U. 327, 134 P. 1175. 
(2) The complaint shall be filed in the court most convenient to the 
plaintiff. 
Collateral References. 39 Am. Jur. 2d 265, Habeas Corpus 
Habeas Corpus<^=341 et seq. § 120. 
39A C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 165. 
(3) Upon the filing of the complaint the court shall, unless it appears 
from such complaint or the showing of the plaintiff that he is not entitled 
to any relief, issue a writ directed to the defendant commanding him to 
bring the person alleged to be restrained before the court at a time and 
place therein specified, at which time the court shall proceed in a summary 
manner to hear the matter and render judgment accordingly. If the writ 
is not issued the court shall state its reasons therefor in writing and file 
the same with the complaint, and shall deliver a copy thereof to the 
plaintiff. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Federal Rule 81(a)(2) provides that the 
writ of habeas corpus shall be directed to 
the person having custody of the person 
detained. 
Burden of Proof. 
In petition for writ of habeas corpus it 
was the duty of the petitioner to present 
convincing evidence that he was wrong-
fully incarcerated. Farrow v. Smith, 541 
P. 2d 1107. 
Right to hearing. 
Rule contemplates that if hearing is 
held, party seeking relief is entitled to 
be present, so that court erred in pro 
ceeding in summary manner to hold hear 
ing in absence of party and his counsel 
Stinnett v. Turner, 20 U. (2d) 148, 434 R 
2d 753, distinguished in 23 U. (2d) 303 
305, 462 P. 2d 705, 706. 
Written reasons for refusal. 
Requirement that reasons for refusal of 
writ be in writing is intended to be of 
assistance to both petitioner and judge if 
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petitioner seeks recovery of forfeiture or in habeas corpus proceedings for re-
under 78-35-1. Farrell v. Turner, 25 U. lease of one sought to be extradited, 77 
(2d) 351, 482 P. 2d 117. A. L. R. 902. 
Determination in extradition proceed-
OoUateral References. ings,
 o r o n habeas corpus in such proceed-
Habeas Corpus@»59 et seq. ings, whether a crime is charged, 40 A. 
39A C.J.8. Habeas Corpus § 171 et seq. L. R. 2d 1151. 
39 Am. Jur. 2d 269 et seq., Habeas Cor- Former jeopardy as ground for habeas 
pus § 129 et seq. corpus, 8 A. L. R. 2d 285. 
Right of state or public officer to appeal 
Bar of limitations as proper subject of from an order in habeas corpus releasing 
investigation in extradition proceedings one from custody, 30 A. L. R. 1322. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Issues triable. The right of plaintiff to be promptly 
An issue of former conviction could not heard and to be discharged if illegally 
be tried on habeas corpus in the Supreme held was of very essence of proceeding. 
Court. In re Barton, 6 U. 264, 21 P. 998. In re Clasby, 3 U. 183, 1 P. 852. 
Provision for summary hearing did not 
Summary Hearing. tuthorize court to stay judgment of un-
Object of writ was that the right to a onditional discharge and to remand 
discharge could in a summary manner be petitioner to custody pending appeal. 
at once determined. In re Clasby, 3 U. Dickson v. Mullings, 66 U. 282. 241 P. 
183, 1 P. 852. 840, 43 A. L. R. 136. 
(4) If the defendant cannot be found, or if he does not have such 
person in custody, the writ (and any other process issued) may be served 
upon any one having such person in custody, in the manner and with the 
same effect as if he had been made defendant in the action. 
CoUateral Beferences. 39 Am. Jur. 2d 271, 272, Habeas Corpus 
Habeas Corpus<§»67. §§ *32, 133. 
39A C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 177. 
(5) If the defendant conceals himself, or refuses admittance to the 
person attempting to serve the writ, or if he attempts wrongfully to 
carry the person imprisoned or restrained out of the county or state after 
service of the writ, the person serving the writ shall immediately arrest 
the defendant, or other person so resisting, and bring him, together with 
the person designated in the writ, forthwith before the court before which 
the writ is made returnable. 
CoUateral References. 39 Am. Jur. 2d 305, Habeas Corpus 
Habeas Corpus<8=>81. §§ 176, 177. 
39A C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 187. 
(6) At the time of the issuance of the writ, the court may, if it 
appears that the person designated will be carried out of the jurisdiction 
of the court or will suffer some irreparable injury before compliance with 
the writ can be enforced, cause a warrant to issue, reciting the facts, and 
directing the sheriff to take such person and forthwith bring him before 
the court to be dealt with according to law. 
CoUateral References. 39 Am. Jur. 2d 277, 278, Habeas Corpus 
Habeas Corpus<§=>71, 82. §§ 144> 1 4 5-
39A C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 185. 
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(7) The defendant shall appear at the proper time and place with 
the person designated or show good cause for not doing so and must 
answer the complaint within the time allowed. The answer must state 
plainly and unequivocally whether he then has, or at any time has had, 
the person designated under his control and restraint, and if so, the 
cause thereof. If such person has been transferred, the defendant must 
state that fact, and to whom, when the transfer was made, and the reason 
or authority therefor. The writ shall not be disobeyed for any defect of 
form or misdescription of the person restrained or defendant, if enough 
is stated to show the meaning and intent thereof. 
Compiler's Notes. 39A C.J.S. Habeas Corpus §§180, 181. 
Federal Rule 81(a)(2) requires a return 39 Am. Jur. 2d 272 et seq., Habeas 
within three days, but up to forty days Corpus § 135 et seq. 
may be allowed in state custody cases 
where a federal remedy is sought, and up Liability of judge, court, administrative 
to twenty days may be allowed in other officer, or other custodian of person for 
federal cases. whose release the writ is sought, in con-
_
 m nection with habeas corpus proceedings, 
Collateral References. g4 ^ . L. R. 807. 
Habeas Corpus@»73% et seq. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Demurrer to petition* by demurrer. Nickolopolous v. Emery, 59 
Facts alleged in petition were admitted U. 588, 206 P. 284. 
(8) The person restrained may waive his right to be present at the 
hearing, in which case the writ shall be modified accordingly. Pending a 
determination of the matter the court may place such person in the 
custody of such individual or individuals as may be deemed proper. 
CoUateral Beferences. 39 Am. Jur. 2d 277, 278, Habeas Corpus 
Habeas Corpus<&=>71, 82. §§ 144> 1 4 5-
39A C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 185. 
(g) Proceedings Where Relief Sought in Supreme Court. If the 
complaint seeking relief is filed in the Supreme Court, that court may 
order the writ returnable either before it or before any district court. 
If the taking of any evidence is necessary for a determination of the 
matter, the Supreme Court may refer the matter to a district court or 
to a master under the provisions of these Rules, for a hearing of such 
facts as may be necessary. 
Compiler's Notes. 26 Am Jur. 2d 467 to 469, Courts §§ 108 
There is no Fed. Rule covering the sub t o n o ; 3 9 A m - J u r - 2<* 255> Habeas Corpus 
ject matter contained in this Rule. §108; 52 Am. Jur. 2d 347 et seq., Man-
damus §21 et seq.; 63 Am. Jur. 2d 268, 
Collateral References. Prohibition §37; 65 Am. Jur. 2d 320 et 
Courts<£=>206, 207, 248; Habeas Corpus seq., Quo Warranto § 127 et seq. 
<§=>44, 46, 47; Mandamus<§=>141; Prohibi-
tion<§=>16; Quo Warranto<S=»27. Return: civil liability of one making 
21 C.J.S. Courts §§311, 312, 465; 39 false or fraudulent return of process, 31 
C.J.S. Habeas Corpus §142; 55 C.J.S. A. L. R. 3d 1393. 
Mandamus §240; 73 C.J.S. Prohibition Return: failure to make return as af-
§ 18; 74 C.J.S. Quo Warranto § 24. fecting validity of service or court's juris-
diction, 82 A. L. R. 2d 668. 
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DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Effect of demurrer In district court. 
When, upon application to Supreme 
Court for an alternative writ, the ques-
tion presented to that court must turn 
upon the facts that were admitted by the 
demurrer in the district court, and the 
sole question was whether, upon the con-
ceded facts, the judgment of the district 
court should not have been in favor of 
application, then defendant could not, for 
first time, deny in Supreme Court the 
truth of the facts which were admitted in 
district court and upon which that court 
entered judgment. Defendant had to stand 
or fall upon demurrer filed in district 
court. If defendant desired to raise an 
issue of fact, he should file answer in 
district court. Ketchum Coal Co. v. 
Christensen, 48 U. 214, 159 P. 541. 
Jurisdiction of Supreme Court. 
Supreme Court will not assume jurisdic-
tion at relation of a private person, except 
in cases which presented some special 
reason or some special or peculiar emer-
gency, or where the interests of the state 
at large were shown to be such as to 
render it apparent that the interests of 
justice required its exercise. State ex rel. 
Lloyd v. Elliott, 13 U. 200, 44 P. 248. 
Supreme Court had original concurrent 
jurisdiction with district court in habeas 
corpus proceedings. Bell v. Corlcss, 57 
U. 604, 196 P. 568. 
(h) When Writ Returnable. Any alternative writ issued by a court 
or a judge thereof, may be made returnable, and a hearing thereon may 
be had, at any time as such court may in its discretion determine. 
Compiler's Notes. 
In the case of a writ of habeas corpus, 
or order to show cause, Fed. Rule 81(a) 
(2) requires a return within three days, 
but up to forty days may be allowed in 
state custody cases where a federal reme-
dy is sought, and up to twenty days may 
be allowed in other federal cases. 
Collateral References. 
Habeas CorpusO»73% et seq., 90; Man-
damus<&=>164, 170; Prohibit: n<§=>26, 29; 
Quo Warranto@=>50, 58. 
39A C.J.S. Habeas Corpus §§180, 209; 
55 C.J.8. Mandamus §§319. 332; 73 C.J.S. 
Prohibition §§ 29, 36; 74 C.J.S. Quo War-
ranto §§ 38, 44. 
39 Am. Jur. 2d 273, 275, Habeas Corpus 
§§ 136, 142; 52 Am. Jur. 2d 756, 780, Man-
damus §§432, 460; 63 Am. Jur. 2d 276 to 
279, Prohibition §§45, 46; 65 Am. Jur. 2d 
259, 308, Quo Warranto §§ 91, 108. 
(i) Postconviction Hearings. 
(1) Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary or county jail under a 
commitment of any court, whether such imprisonment be under an original 
commitment or under a commitment for violation of probation or parole, 
who asserts that in any proceedings which resulted in his commitment 
there was a substantial denial of his rights under the Constitution of the 
United States or of the State of Utah, or both, may institute a proceeding 
under this Rule. 
Such proceedings shall be commenced by filing a complaint, together 
with a copy thereof, with the clerk of the court in which such relief is 
sought. The complainant shall also serve a copy of the complaint so filed 
upon the attorney general of the State of Utah if imprisoned in the state 
prison, or the county attorney of the county where imprisoned if in a 
county jail. Such service may be made by any of the methods provided 
for service in Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, or by mailing 
such copy to the attorney general or county attorney by United States mail 
postage prepaid, and by filing with the clerk of said court a certificate of 
mailing certifying under oath that a copy was so mailed to the attorney 
general or county attorney. Upon the filing of such a complaint, the clerk 
shall promptly bring the same to the attention of the presiding judge of the 
court in which such complaint is filed. 
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(2) The complaint shall state that the person seeking relief is illegally 
restrained of his liberty by the defendant; shall state the place where 
he is so restrained; shall state the dates of and identify the proceedings 
in which the complainant was convicted and by which he was subsequently 
confined and of which he now complains; and shall set forth in plain and 
concise terms the factual data constituting each and every manner in 
which the complainant claims that any constitutional rights were violated. 
The complaint shall have attached thereto affidavits, copies of records, 
or other evidence supporting such allegations, or shall state why the same 
are not attached. 
The complaint shall also state whether or not the judgment of con-
viction that resulted in the confinement complained of has been reviewed 
on appeal, and if so, shall identify such appellate proceedings and state 
the results thereof. 
The complaint shall further state that the legality or constitutionality 
of his commitment or confinement has not already been adjudged in a 
prior habeas corpus or other similar proceeding; and if the complainant 
shall have instituted prior similar proceedings in any court, state or federal, 
within the State of Utah, he shall so state in his complaint, shall attach 
a copy of any pleading filed in such court by him to his complaint, and 
shall set forth the reasons for the denial of relief in such other court. 
In such case, if it is apparent to the court in which the proceeding under 
this Rule is instituted that the legality or constitutionality of his confine-
ment has already been adjudged in such prior proceedings, the court shall 
forthwith dismiss such complaint, giving written notice thereof by mail 
to the complainant, and no further proceedings shall be had on such com-
plaint. 
(3) Argument, citations and discussion of authorities shall not be set 
forth in the complaint, but may be set out in a separate supporting 
memorandum or brief if the complainant so desires. 
(4) All claims of the denial of any of complainant's constitutional 
rights shall be raised in the postconviction proceeding brought under 
this Rule and may not be raised in another subsequent proceeding except 
for good cause shown therein. 
(5) If the complainant is not represented by counsel when the com-
plaint is filed, he shall advise the court upon filing his complaint whether 
he intends to employ his own counsel, and if he does not do so, or if he 
requests the court to appoint counsel, the presiding judge shall forthwith 
appoint counsel to represent complainant and shall give notice to the 
complainant and the attorney general or county attorney of such ap-
pointment. 
(6) Within ten days after service of a copy of the complaint upon 
him, the attorney general, or the county attorney, as the case may be, 
shall answer the complaint or otherwise plead thereto. Any further plead-
ings or amendments shall be in conformity with the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
(7) "When an answer is filed, the court shall immediately set the case 
for a hearing within twenty days thereafter unless the court in its 
365 
Rule 65B(i) (8) RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
discretion determines that further time is needed. Prior to the hearing, the 
state or county shall obtain such transcript of proceedings or court records 
as may be relevant and material to the case. The court, on its own motion, 
or upon the request of either party, may order a prehearing conference 
if good reason exists therefor; but such conference shall not be set so 
as to unreasonably delay the hearing on the merits of the complaint. The 
complainant shall be brought before the court for any hearing or confer-
ence. 
If the court in which the complaint is filed determines that in the 
interest of convenience and economy, the hearing should be transferred 
to the district court having jurisdiction over the place of confinement of 
complainant, the court may enter a written order transferring such case 
and shall set forth in such order its reasons for so doing. 
(8) In each case, the court, upon determining the case, shall enter 
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment, in writing, 
and the same shall be made a part of the record in the case. 
If the court finds in favor of the complainant, it shall enter an appro-
priate order with respect to the judgment or sentence in the former 
proceedings and such further orders with respect to rearraignment, retrial, 
custody, bail or discharge as the court may deem just and proper in the 
case. 
(9) If the complainant is unable to pay the costs of the proceedings, 
he may proceed in forma pauperis upon the filing of an affidavit to that 
effect, in which event the court may direct the costs to be paid by the 
county in which he was originally charged. 
(10) Any final judgment entered upon such complaint may be ap-
pealed to and reviewed by the Supreme Court of Utah as an appeal in 
civil cases. 
Compiler's Notes. 
Rule 65B('i) was adopted by the Su-
preme Court effective August 20, 1969. 
The federal statute governing remedies 
on motion attacking sentence appears at 
28 U.S.C. § 2255. 
Collateral References. 
Criminal Law@=>1186. 
24B C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1947 et seq. 
21 Am. Jur. 2d 266, Criminal Law § 227. 
Absence of convicted defendant during 
hearing or argument of motion for new 
trial or in arrest of judgment, 69 A. L. R. 
2d 835. 
Advising accused: violation of due proc-
ess by failure of court to inform accused 
who is not represented by counsel of his 
right not to testify, 79 A. L. R. 2d 643. 
Alcohol test: admission in criminal case 
of evidence that accused refused to sub-
mit to scientific test to determine amount 
of alcohol in system, as unlawful search 
or seizure, 87 A. L. R. 2d 378. 
Apparel: pretrial requirement that sus-
pect or accused wear or try on particular 
apparel as violating constitutional rights, 
18 A. L. R. 2d 796. 
Appeal, right of indigent defendant in 
criminal case to aid of state as regards, 
55 A. L. R. 2d 1072. 
Assistance of counsel, duty to advise 
accused as to right to, 3 A. L. R. 2d 1003. 
Blood grouping tests as violation of 
privilege against unreasonable search and 
seizure, 46 A. L. R. 2d 1016. 
Bribery in athletic contest, due process 
under statute as to, 49 A. L. R. 2d 1235. 
Contempt: right to counsel in contempt 
proceedings, 52 A. L. R. 3d 1002. 
Counsel, calling accused's counsel as a 
prosecution witness as improper depriva-
tion of right to, 88 A. L. R. 2d 796. 
Counsel chosen by accused, incompe-
tency of, as affecting validity of convic-
tion, 74 A. L. R. 2d 1390. 
Cross-examination: court's right, in im-
posing sentence, to hear evidence of, or 
to consider, other offenses committed by 
defendant as violating due process of law 
in denying the right to be confronted by 
or to cross-examine adverse witnesses, 96 
A. L. R. 2d 796. 
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Addendum C 
Not Reported in P 2d 
2001UTApp27 
(Cite as: 2001 WL 311418 (Utah App.)) 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Troy REES, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 991078-CA. 
Feb. 1,2001. 
H. Don Sharp, Ogden, for appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Marian Decker, Salt Lake 
City, for appellee. 
Before JACKSON, ORME, and THORNE, JJ. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
JACKSON 
*1 Rees first challenges the trial court's ruling on 
his motion to suppress evidence. The record shows 
the trial court relied on evidence presented in the 
preliminary hearing to decide the suppression issue. 
However, Rees failed to incorporate the preliminary 
hearing transcript, the suppression hearing 
transcript, and the affidavit in support of the search 
warrant into the record. A complete record is 
essential in this case because "issues presented in 
search and seizure cases are highly fact sensitive." 
State v Lovegreen, 798 P.2d 767, 770 (Utah 
Ct App. 1990) Because some transcripts were not 
included in the record, we are unable to review 
pertinent factual findings by the trial court m our 
evaluation of whether someone had the authority to 
consent to a search. "In the absence of an adequate 
record on appeal, we cannot address the issues 
raised and [we] presume the correctness of the 
disposition made by the trial court." State v 
Rawhngs, 829 P .2d 150, 152-53 (Utah 
CtApp.1992); see also Utah R.App.P. 11(e)(2). 
[FN1] 
Page 1 
FN1. We note that Rees did not file a reply 
brief. The State's bnef argues several 
procedural failures which Rees did not 
address m his opening brief. Absent a 
reply brief, the State's characterization of 
the record and the important nature of the 
omitted transcripts stands unchallenged. 
Next, Rees challenges the trial court's finding that 
he possessed marijuana with intent to distribute. To 
successfully challenge a trial court's factual finding, 
Rees must first marshal the evidence in support of 
the finding and then show why that evidence is 
legally insufficient to support the finding. See Utah 
R.App.P. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact 
finding must first marshal all record evidence that 
supports the challenged finding."). Rees has failed 
to marshal the evidence, instead he only points to 
the evidence contrary to the trial court's ruling. See 
State v Decorso, 1999 UT 57, K 41, 993 P.2d 837. 
Thus, we affirm the trial court's finding. See id 
Finally, Rees contends the trial court dismissed the 
case after witnesses for the State failed to appear at 
two scheduled preliminary hearings, and the trial 
court should not have allowed the State to refile 
charges without presenting new evidence. However, 
the record does not bear out Rees's assertions. First, 
the record does not show that the case was 
dismissed and charges were refiled. Second, the 
record shows that the scheduled April 1, 1999 
preliminary heanng was continued at Rees's request 
so that Judge Baldwin could hear the case. The 
April 8, 1999 preliminary hearing was also 
continued at Rees's request. Because Rees has failed 
to provide an adequate record to support his 
contentions on appeal, we presume the correctness 
of the trial court's rulings. See Rawhngs, 829 P 2d 
at 152-53. 
Affirmed. 
ORME and THORNE, Judges, concur. 
2001 WL 311418 (Utah App.), 2001 UTApp27 
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Addendum D 
H DON SHARP, u 2922 
Attorney for Defendant -Petitioner 
Key Bank Building, Suite 200 
2491 Washington Blvd. 
OederL Utah 84401 Zi:i \ ,( -$ O 2- 25 
Tele: (801) 621-1567 
DISTRICT COURT-STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY-OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH. / PETITION FOR 
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ' 
Vs. / Case No. 991900480 
TROY REES, / JUDGE: PARLEY BALDWIN 
Defendant/Petitioner. / 
COMES NOW, Troy Rees, the above named Defendant/Petitioner, by and 
through his attorney H. Don Sharp and hereby petitions this Court for Extraordinary 
Relief under the provisions of Rule 65B (a)(b). 
The reason for requesting extraordinary relief is that the Defendant's appeal was 
denied for the failure of certain transcripts having not been filed with the Court of 
Appeals. These transcripts had been timely ordered, paid for and were on file with the 
Clerk of the District Court but were not filed with the rest of the record. This was 
through no fault of the Defendant/Petitioner, but the Defendant/Petitioner is restrained bv 
the 45 day jail sentence pending if he is not granted the relief requested herein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1 The defendant was conv icted of Possession of Marijuana with intent to 
Distribute (A third Degree Felony) and an accompanying Possession of 
Paraphernalia and Class B Misdemeanor and sentenced on the 2nd dav of 
December, 1999 
2. Included in the sentence was a jail term of 45 days which was stayed pending 
appeal. 
3 The appeal was timely filed and transcripts of all relevant proceedings 
(Preliminary Hearing, Suppression Hearing, and Trial) were ordered, paid for 
and filed with the Court. 
4 Defendant's Appellant Brief was timely filed. 
5 The State's Reply Brief was filed. 
6 The State argued in its reply brief that appellate record (Preliminary Hearing 
and Suppression Hearing Transcripts) was not complete. 
7 Defendant's counsel, upon receipt of the State's Brief glanced at the three 
Arguments set out on the Table of Contents page of the Brief and obviously 
did not pick up on the defect in the record. 
8. The State did not inquire of Defendant's attorney as to the whereabouts of the 
Transcripts. 
9 The Court of Appeals dismissed the Appeal on the insufficient record. 
10 After receipt of the Court of Appeals decision defendant's counsel contacted 
Fran Lund, of the Distnct Court Clerks office to see if the transcripts were on 
file. After she looked for them the transcripts of the Preliminary Hearing and 
Suppression Ik^nn^ wnh* Iniciiui I m lh< "» li.ul Icui tiled on a different shelf 
than the rest ot the record. She confirmed at that time that the transcripts had 
nfii h v n fili'ii. 
11
 ' :ie defendant was unaware of the above problems in his appert! 
IV <p<Hl'< l h | f I lilt,' i l l M i l l ' ^ R i l 
12 There are important legal and factual issues that sr 
case and uiidei the circumstances the defendant has been denied his right to 
appeal through no fault of his own. 
1 . ,-.lv remedy foi uu* "^ Te c*f Pre Mem is threwr a Petition for Extraordinary 
Relief under Rule 65B oi ilu - 'tah Rules <«M I p \\ • .
 t Vinson, 
635 P Jd 36 (1981) 
WHEREFORE, Petition, 
1. That me court fio;d an ev • Je:. .r' ** necessary to determine if the 
' v»i . oi^utuuona* j ,gnt to appeal and that 
•*as no laur - he Hefendant Petitioner, 
iinding oi J. jcKiai o; i..c ngnt to appeal through no fault of the 
defendant to re-sentence the defendant and a 
refiled 
Dated this ^'h da> o< M.r '^- ' 
. DON SHARP^ATTORNEY FOR PF^< "IONER 
Addendum l. 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH vs. TRO^ f REES 
CASE NUMBER 991900480 State Felony 
CHARGES 
Charge 1 - 58-37-8(1AIV; - POSS W/IN1ENT TO DIST C/SUBSTANCE 
3rd Degree Felony Plea: October 21, 1999 Not Guilty 
Disposition: October 21, 1999 Guilty 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
PARTIES 
Plamtifi - STATE OF UTAH 
Represented by: CAMILLE L. NEIDER 
Defendant - TROY REES 
PLEASANT VIEW, UT 84414 
Represented by: H DON SH^RP 
DEFENDANT INt D R M H T U N 
Defendant Name: TROY REES 
Offense tracking number: 8180903 
Date of Birth: January 13, 1964 
Law Enforcement Agency: WEBER MORGAN STRIKE 
Prosecuting Agency: WEBER COUNTY 
Citation Number: 99-0243F 
Violation Date: August 07, 1998 WEBER COUNTY 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 




TRUST TOTALS I rust Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Credit: 




















REVENUE DETAIL - T^PE: FINE 
Amount Due: 1,000.00 
Amount Paid: 0.00 
illp \i h in • iik <Hiits ^ov /casesearch /rn<sP<Npirrh°i/-tt^r« 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Before Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
05-09-01 Filed: PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
05-10-01 Minute Entry - Minutes for MOTION HEARING 
Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: deboiew 
Prosecutor: NEIDER, CAMILLE L. 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): SHARP, H. DON 
Video 
Tape Number: B051001 Tape Count: 9;27 
HEARING 
This is time set for motion hearing on the motion for 
extraordinary relief. Hearing not held. State objects to the motion 
filed as the case has already been adjudicated in the Court of 
Appeals. 
Court dismisses the petition and finds that the case has been 
adjudicated in the Court of Appeals. Court imposes the original 
sentence and imposes the original 45 days jail. 
Court allows the defendant to be released for work through the 
Kiesel facility in lieu of the jail diversion facility. All other 
terms of probation are reaffirmed. 
06-07-01 Filed: NOTICE OF APPEAL 
06-15-01 Filed: LETTER FROM COURT OF APPEALS #20010490-CA 
07-05-01 REVIEW OF SENTENCE scheduled on July 12, 2001 at 09:00 AM in 
3rd Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN. 
07-06-01 Fee Account created Total Due: 25.00 
07-06-01 REPORTER FEES Payment Received: 25.00 
Note: REPORTER FEES; Mail Payment; 
07-12-01 Minute Entry - Minutes for REVIEW OF SENTENCE 
Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: debbiew 
Prosecutor: CORP, SANDRA L. 
Printed: 11/1~Y03 13:43:35 Page 18 
C^SE NUMBER 991900480 State Felony 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): SHARP, H. DON 
Video 
Tape Number: B071201 Tape Count: 9:22 
HEARING 
This is time set for review of sentence. Court imposes the 
original sentence of formal probation and grants the request for a 
new evaluation to be completed by Adult Probation & Parole for 
substance abuse treatment. 
/r^o^Coar^9QrHrm=rn<;eHkt 11/1 7/2003 
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BRIF.I "I MM'I I I M'll 
APPEAL FROM THE SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
OF A MOTION FOR EXTRAORDINARY 
RELIEF FILED UNDER RULE 65B (a)(b). 
HON. PARLEY BALDWIN PRESIDING. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
J. FREDRIC VOROS, JR. 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-0300 
Attorney for Appellee 
H. DON SHARP #2922 
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Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-1567 
Attorney for Appellant 
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POINi i: iHfc 1K1AL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING 
ANY CONSIDERATION TO THE DEFENDANT'S LACK 
OF FAULT IN A PROCEDURAL DEFECT OF THE A 
APPEAL PROCESS... 
CONTI USION 
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. ^ u t X T 1 • MUMBERTWO-PETP • . - .u 
ADDENDUM NUMBER THREE—AFFIDA.;. ji ~~~:<5EL 
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il Ill i' 01- vUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Page 
State v. John** 3, 4, 6 
State v. Railings 8> J - » 1, 3, 5 
CONSTlTU'i I V N A L P R O V I S I O N S AND STATUTES 
( Itah Rules of Appellate Proced'ure - Rule l ie 2 
I iit.li Rtik'n in "ippeilaiLc Fiuceduit Kulc L ' 2 
I 'tah Rules of Civil Procedure - Rule 65B ' 2 
I \ THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ST ATFOFUTAH, 
I""I. lift'and Appellee, 
* 'S 
TROYREES, 
Defennljni .iiinJ A|un.'lli.int 
J U R I S D I C T I 0 N Q F T H £ C Q U R T Q F A P P E A L S 
Him ii["-1v.J (from a summary dismissal o f the Defendant ' s Motion for Extraordinary 
Relief under Rule 65B. 
if "( i HI] i i isdictioii to hear this appeal by vir tue o f 78-2a-3(2)(f). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court entered ii Minmiiii
 t
i
 ilisnut 'Mil I limn • I teteikiani •» l'"aiu n nur 
Extraordinary Relief under Rule 65B, based on the Conclusion, that the issue had 'been 
. ,
 L Appeals p r e s u m e c | t h e correctness 
of the rulings at trial on the basis o f an inadequate record on. appeal. The appeal w as not 
ili'i iHeil iin mini UK in I  I'llJlr11 Ii I iiiiiiiiil I  ijid *. ul Ippeltaiit b brief, through no fault 
<-f the defendant. 
t j ^ £0UIt t| ii:lc | n a l <j0lirt committed err in not considering the 
defendant \ .u K of fault in a procedural defect in the appeal process 
T he Standard for rev iew is for correctness. State v. Rawlings, 829 P.2d 150, 
atl52. 
1 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
UTAH COURT RULES .ANNOTATED 2001—UTAH RULES OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE - RULE 11(c) 
%iDuty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, 
or in the event that more than one appeal is taken, each appellant, 
shall comply with the provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this 
rule and shall take any other action necessary to enable the clerk of 
the trial court to assemble and transmit the record. A single record 
shall be transmitted." 
UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED 2001—UTAH RULES OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE—RULE 12 
(b) Transmittal of record on appeal to appellate court; duty of 
trial court cleric 
(1) Duty of trial court clerk in criminal cases. In criminal cases, 
the record will be transmitted by the clerk of the court to the 
clerk of the appellate court upon completion of the transcript under 
(a) above or, it there is no transcript, within 20 days of the filing of 
the notice of appeal 
UTAH COURT RULES ANNOTATED 2001—UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE—RULE 65B(b)(5) 
Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is 
apparent to the court that the legality of the restraint has already 
been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any other reason 
any claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on its face, the 
court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating 
that the claim is frivolous on its face and the reasons for this 
conclusion. The order need not state findings of feet or conclusions 
of law. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings 
on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case, course and disposition below 
The defendant was convicted of Possession of Marijuana with Intent to 
Distribute and sentenced on the 2nd of December, 1999. The trial court granted a 
Certificate of Probable Cause and an appeal was filed. All transcripts were 
prepared and paid for and the Defendant/Appellant's Brief was timely filed. The 
2 
State s reply was also ti mely filed. The appellant's attorney complied ' vuh the 
requirements, ot r 
the transcripts of the Preiirrinon Hearing mc **e ^unoression Hearing ^e:^ .... 
ii-* • ' in hie I hem A uh the rest of 
the record. 
Il In i Y i ' i i i i I ! p\„ tMl'.i ilnl not .UJAJITSS l.he issues in Founts 1 & 2 ot the 
Appellant's Briefon the grounds that since the tran scripts of the Preliminary 
Hearing Jiid Hit1 suppression Hear iiig fmd not been filed, the court was therefore 
bound bv its decision in State \ ' Rowlings, 829 P.2d 150, (1992). 
DetendaniL Appellant's counsel should have, but unfortunately did not realize the 
procedural defect 'until after the Court of A one:i Is rrndrnvl n n •> r ,i r I i 
II I'.ionlCaseNo. 991078-CA), 
Couns. , n 
accompanying Affidavit (< * ind vhile that M* *;o- : ^? counsel filed 
~ ' ,oi ^ n s 
also supported by the Affidavit of counsel . R- : l- * mp\ State *. Johnson, 635 
P VI In IIMI iu:ompawed the Motion fo ^u^Uuuiry Relief. 
The Trial Court dismissed the Pet't«o* rui Extraordinary Relief on the 
c>niiuidi l lu( the issues had hcai I| I t>y *he Court of Appeals, and gave no 
consideration to the fact that the Defendant was not at fault m the pnuvil r ill 
defects of the case, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
3 
The Statement of Facts in this appeal are basically set forth above in the 
Statement of the Case. To avoid being repetitive we refer to the Statement of the 
Case and the following brief supplement. 
A copy of the Court of Appeal's Memorandum Decision is made a part of 
this Brief as Addendum No. 1. 
The Petition for Extraordinary Relief (R-121 ) is made a part of this Brief 
as Addendum No. 2. 
The Affidavit of Counsel (R-l 13 ) is made a part of this Brief as 
Addendum No.3. 
Judge Baldwin's decision to dismiss as set forth in the transcript of the 
Hearing on Motion May 10, 2001 on Page 2 Lines 17 through 25 reads as follows: 
Tve read the rule. Fve read the case. I'm dismissing the petition. I'm 
finding that the Court doesn't have to find pursuant to the rule, doesn't 
have to find facts or conclusions of law but I'm filing (sic) it has been 
adjudicated in the Court of Appeals, that I'm not taking further jurisdiction 
in the case and I'm imposing the sentence and Mr. Rees if you'll go with 
the bailiff and start spending your time. The imposition of the sentence is 
taking place right now." 
ARGUMENT POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING ANY 
CONSIDERATION TO THE DEFENDNT'S LACK OF 
FAULT IN A PROCEDURAL DEFECT OF THE APPEAL 
PROCESS 
Rule 65B, coupled with the decision in State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 
(Utah 1981) Provides the means by which a defendant, who is not at fault, can 
petition the court to re-sentence him as a means of proceeding with the appeal 
process. This procedure is generally used when ti~i defendant's counsel fails to 
4 
timely file a Notice of Appeal and the defendant looses jurisdiction due to no fault 
of his own. 
State v. Rowlings, 829 P.2d 150, (Court of Appeal 1992) may even limit 
this procedure to a "first right of appeal" as is stated at page 154, as follows: 
"The State reads Johnson too narrowly. When resentencing 
Takes pLce to allow a first right of appeal, as set forth in 
Johnson, this should not rule out the procedural possibility 
that post-conviction motions may be appropriately heard in 
the sentencing court." 
The problem in this case is that the defendant was without fault in not 
detecting a defect in the first appeal process. This raises the question of whether 
or not he has any remedy to be resentenced so that Points 1 and 2 of the original 
appeal may be decided on the merits. 
The transcripts of the Preliminary Hearing and the Suppression Hearing 
were not forwarded to the Court of Appeal by the Clerk of the Court. The failure 
of the Clerk to forward the transcripts was not realized by the defendant's counsel 
until after the decision of the Court of Appeals was rendered. As the Defendant's 
trial counsel and counsel on appeal, I (the undersigned) should have discovered 
the problem. This was not the defendant's fault. This oversight was acknowledged 
in the Petition filed under Rule 65. 
The Trial Court did not give any consideration as to whether or not the 
defendant was a fault- The Trial court simply said he would take no further 
jurisdiction because the matter had been adjudicated. (Hearing on Motion - May 
10,2001Page2) 
%4In all criminal prosecutions, an accused has a constitutional 
right to a timely appeal from his conviction. Utah Constitution, 
5 
Art. I, Sec. 12: Weaver v. Kimball, 59 Utah 72, 202 P. 9 (1921) 
(State v Johnson, Supra at 37) 
There was in fact a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals (Case No. 
99-1078CA). The trial court considered this an adjudication, [t was not an 
adjudication on the merits of Points 1 & 2 of the Appellate Brief 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant respectfully requests this court to remand this case back to 
the Trial Court with instructions to determine if the defendant was not at fault in 
the appeal process and if not at fault, to Order that the defendant be resentenced 
so that he can appeal for a determination on the merits of Points 1 & 2 of the 




I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of his brief to the Plaintiff -
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Karen Klucznik 
Deputy Attorney General 
160 E 300 So. 6* Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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IN THE UTAH COURT Or APPEALS 
ccCco 
FILED 
Utah Cout at Appeals 
i-td . 1 2001 
PaufettoStagg 
Cleric of the Court 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Troy Rees, 
Defendant and Appellant 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) (Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 991073-CA 
F I L E D 
(February 1, 2 001) 
2001 UT Ace 2' 
Second District, Ogden Department 
The Honorable Parley R. Baldwin 
Attorneys: H. Don Sharp, Ogden, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Marian Decker, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Jackson, Orme, and Thome. 
JACKSON, Associate Presiding Judge: 
Rees first challenges the trial court's rul 
to suppress evidence. The record shows the tria 
evidence presented in the preliminary hearing to 
suppression issue. However, Rees failed to inco 
preliminary hearing transcript, the suppression 
transcript, and the affidavit in support of the 
into the record. A complete record is essential 
because "issues presented in search and seizure 
fact sensitive." State v. Loveareen, 793 P.2d 7 
App. 1990). Because some transcripts were not i 
record, we are unable to review pertinent factua 
trial court in our evaluation of whether someone 
authority to consent to a search. "In the absen 
record on appeal, we cannot address the issues r 
presume the correctness of the disposition made 
court." State v. Rawlinas, 829 P.2d 150, 152-53 
1992); see also Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2).' 
m g on nis motion 





in this case 
cases are highly 
67, 770 (Utah Ct . 
ncluded in the 
1 findings by the 
had the 
ce of an adequate 
aised and [we] 
by the trial 
(Utah Ct. Aoo. 
1. We note that Rees did not file a reply brief. The State's 
brief argues several procedural failures which Rees did not 
address in his opening brief. Absent a reply brief, the State's 
(Continued on the next cage.) 
Next, Rees challenges the trial court's finding that he 
possessed marijuana with intent to distribute. To successfully 
cnallenge a trial court's factual finding, Rees must first 
marshal the evidence in support of the finding and then show why 
that evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding 
Sge. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact finding 
must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding.")- Rees has failed to marshal the evidence, 
instead he only points to the evidence contrary to the trial 
court's ruling. ££S State v. Decorso. 1999 UT 57,141, 993 P.2d 
83 7. Thus, we affirm the trial court's finding. See id 
Finally, Rees contends the trial court dismissed the case 
after witnesses for the State failed to appear at two scheduled 
preliminary hearings, and the trial court should not have allowed 
tne State to refile charges without presenting new evidence. 
However, the record does not bear out Rees's assertions. First, 
the record does not show that the case was dismissed and cnarges 
were refiled Second, the record shows that the scheduled April 
1, 1999 preliminary hearing was continued at Rees's request so 
that Judge Baldwin could hear the case. The April 8, 199 9 
preliminary hearing was also continued at Rees's request. 
Because Rees has failed to provide an adequate record to support 
his contentions on appeal, we presume the correctness of the 
trial court'3 rulings. See Rawlmas, 829 P.2d at 152-53. 
Affirmed. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gregory K/Orme, Judge 
William A. Thome, Jr., Judge 
1. ( ..continued) 
characterization of the record and the important nature of the 
omitted transcripts stands unchallenged. 
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Case No. 991900480 
JUDGE: PARLEY BALDWIN 
COMES NOW, Troy Rees, the above named Defendant/Petitioner, by and 
through his attorney H. Don Sharp and hereby petitions this Court for Extraordinary 
Relief under the provisions of Rule 65B (a)(b). 
The reason for requesting extraordinary relief is that the Defendant's appeal was 
denied for the failure of certain transcripts having not been filed with the Court of 
Appeals. These transcripts had been timely ordered, paid for and were on file with the 
Clerk of the District Court but were not filed with the rest of the record. This was 
through no fault of the Defendant/Petitioner, but the Defendant/Petitioner is restrained by 
the 45 day jail sentence pending if he is not granted the relief requested herein. 
ADDZ:;: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The defendant was convicted of Possession of Marijuana with intent to 
Distribute (A third Degree Felony) and an accompanying Possession of 
Paraphernalia and Class B Misdemeanor and sentenced on the 2nd dav ot 
December, 1999. 
2. Included in the sentence was a jail term of 45 days which was stayed pending 
appeal. 
3. The appeal was timely filed and transcripts of all relevant proceedings 
(Preliminary Hearing, Suppression Hearing, and Trial) were ordered, paid for 
and filed with the Court. 
4. Defendant's Appellant Brief was timely filed. 
5. The State's Reply Brief was filed. 
6. The State argued in its reply brief that appellate record (Preliminary Hearing 
and Suppression Hearing Transcripts) was not complete. 
7. Defendant's counsel, upon receipt of the State's Brief glanced at the three 
Arguments set out on the Table of Contents page of the Brief and obviously 
did not pick up on the defect in the record. 
8. The State did not inquire of Defendant's attorney as to the whereabouts of the 
Transcripts. 
9. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Appeal on the insufficient record. 
10. After receipt of the Court of Appeals decision defendant's counsel contacted 
Fran Lund, of the District Court Clerks office to see if the transcripts were on 
file. After she looked for them the transcripts of the Preliminary Hearing and 
Suppression Hearing were located, but they had been filed on a different shelf 
than the rest of the record. She confirmed at that time that the transcripts had 
not been filed. 
11. The defendant was unaware of the above problems in his appeal, and was not 
responsible for the dismissal. 
12. There are important legal and factual issues that should be reviewed in this 
case and under the circumstances the defendant has been denied his right to 
appeal through no fault of his own. 
13. The only remedy for this type of Problem is threw a Petition for Extraordinary 
Relief under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. State v. Johnson, 
635 P.2d36(1981) 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for relief as follows: 
1. That the Court hold an evidentiary if necessary to determine if the 
Defendant has been denied his Constitutional right to appeal and that 
the denial was no fault of the Defendant/Petitioner. 
2. Upon a finding of a denial of the right to appeal through no fault of the 
defendant to re-sentence the defendant and allow the appeal to be 
refiled. 
Dated this 9th day of May, 2001 
H. DON SHARP, ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER 
H. DON SHARP. * 2922 
Attorney for Defendant 
Key Bank Building, Suite 200 
2491 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Tele: (801) 621-1567 
DISTRICT COURT-STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY-OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
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JUDGE: 
Conies now H. Don Sharp and having been first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am the attorney of record in the above entitled matter. 
2. The appeal was timely filed and the brief was timely submitted. 
3. The appeal was denied on the grounds that the transcripts of the Preliminary 
Hearing and the Suppression Hearing were not filed with the Appellate Court. 
4. The Transcripts were prepared, paid for and filed with the District Court prior 
to the filing of the appeal. 
5. Rule 11 (d) (1) of the Rules of Appellate procedure require the clerk of the 
court, in criminal cases, shall forward all papers that are a part of the case to 
the Court of Appeals. 
d u w _ . l . 
6. The Transc 
ripts of the Preliminary Heartng
 a n d the Suppression Heann, we . 
located by Fran Lund after the File 
was returned to the District Court. The 
Transcripts that were not filed were in the Clerks office on a shelf but in a 
different location than the rest of the transcripts and were not filed. 
7. That the issues raised in the appeal are extremely important the defendant and 
to the clarification of the laws of search and seizure in the State of Utah-
Dated this 12th day of ApriL^C 
H. "DON SHARP 
NOTARY 
^ 
H. Don Sharp appeared before me on this 12* day of April, 2001 and havmg been 
first duly sworn signed this affidavit in my presence. 
if . 
CYNTHIA E BRUNKER 
% NOTARY PUBLIC • STATE of UTAH 
3491 WASHINGTON 8LVO #200 
OGOEN. UT 84401 
COMM. EXR 10-03-2004 
Addendum G 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
IN THE UNDERLYING CRIMINAL CASE9 
At approximately 8:30 a.m., on 7 August 1998, Deputy Barnett of the Weber County 
Sheriff s Office, and the Mayor of Farr West, Utah, went to property located at 1825 North 
200 West in Farr West to discuss re-zoning the area with property owner David Hunt (R. 
103:20-24). After unsuccessful attempts to find Hunt in a warehouse on the property, Deputy 
Barnett knocked on the door of a fifth wheel trailer which was parked nearby (R. 103:23). 
A female voice said, "Come on in" (id.). After Deputy Barnett opened the door, the female 
inside repeated, "Come on inM (R. 103:24). Upon entering the trailer, Deputy Barnett 
immediately detected a strong odor of burnt marijuana (R. 103:26). The female, who 
appeared to be the sole occupant of the trailer, was wearing pajamas and was wrapped in a 
blanket (R. 103:25-26). The deputy observed that there were several food items and articles 
of clothing scattered around, and also that there was a bed and bedding in the nose of the 
trailer (id.). 
After introducing himself, and without mentioning the burnt marijuana smell, Deputy 
Barnett asked if Hunt was around (R. 103:27). The woman identified herself as Doreen 
Atkin and said that Hunt was only at the property "off and on," and that if his truck was gone, 
he was not around (id.). She then looked outside and confirmed that Hunt's truck was not 
there (id.). 
9
 These are the facts of the underlying criminal conviction, taken from the State's 
brief in the direct appeal (case no. 991078-CA). The facts are stated in the light most 
favorable to the bench verdict. See Johnson v. Higlev. 1999 UT App 278,1J2, 989 P.2d 
61,61 (bench trial). 
Concluding that Hunt was not on the property, Deputy Bamett asked Atkin about the 
burnt manjuana smell inside the trailer (id.). Atkin told him that two other individuals had 
come into the trailer earlier to look for her boyfriend, defendant, and that they had been 
smoking a manjuana cigarette (R. 103:32). Atkin also said that the trailer belonged to 
defendant and that she stayed there overnight because her air conditioner was broken (R. 
103.28). 
Deputy Bamett asked Atkin for permission to search the trailer and Atkin consented 
saying, ifcSure, go ahead. Take a look around" (R. 103:27-28). Deputy Bamett walked into 
the kitchen area, and looking into a garbage bag hanging from a cabinet, saw four manjuana 
stems (R. 103:29). Deputy Bamett asked Atkin if she had been smoking, which she denied 
and also stated that the marijuana stems belonged to the individuals that had been smoking 
manjuana in the trailer earlier (R. 103:32). Deputy Bamett asked if he could continue to 
search and Atkin replied: "Hey, yeah, please look around" (R. 103:32). Atkin also identified 
some bags as hers and invited the deputy to look inside them as well (id.). No contraband 
was located inside the bags (R. 103:33). 
Deputy Bamett next looked inside a kitchen cabinet and found a small cookie tin 
containing loose marijuana, two manjuana pipes (including one that was filled with 
manjuana), two packages of rolling papers, several used plastic baggies, and two baggies still 
containing manjuana (R. 103:33-38). There was also a key nng with approximately four 
keys and a bank card beanng the name 'Troy's Trucking" (R. 103:35-36). The total weight 
of the manjuana found in cupboard was 42 1 grams (R. 103 38). 
At that point, Deputy Barnett told Atkin that he needed to find out who the manjuana 
belonged to and asked that she contact defendant (R. 103*40). Atkin called defendant on a 
cellular phone and Deputy Barnett told him that he needed to speak with him about the 
manjuana in his trailer (R. 103.41). Approximately 45 minutes later, defendant arnved at 
the trailer and was promptly given his Miranda nghts, which he waived (R. 103.41-42).I0 
Following defendant's statement to Deputy Barnett, he was arrested and the trailer 
was seized and inventoned (R. 103:46-48).!' Dunng the inventory search, a locked safe was 
discovered inside one of the trailer's cabinets (R. 103:48). 
Officer Jensen of the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Stnke Force also amved at this time 
and questioned defendant again following a second administration and waiver of Miranda 
nghts (R. 103:46, 91-94). When Officer Jensen asked defendant if he ever shared his 
manjuana with his friends, defendant responded, "basically,... I mean if that's what you're 
getting at, I mean I don't know" (R. 103:99-100) Defendant admitted that he had sold 
manjuana "a long time ago," but also claimed that manjuana in his trailer was "just my 
stash" (R. 103:101). Defendant claimed that he stored the manjuana in different quantities 
"as he comes and goes" (R. 103:103, 108-09). 
"Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1965). 
"Deputy Barnett's interview of defendant in the trailer was audio video recorded 
and was played for the tnal court dunng the bench tnal (R. 103*42-45). The video was 
not included in the record on appeal; however, the State's Objection to the motion to 
suppress indicates that dunng the interview defendant told Deputy Barnett, among other 
things, that the manjuana belonged to him, and that his fnends and coworkers "abuse his 
stash" (R 69). 
Based on defendant's statements to Deputy Barnett and Officer Jensen, as well as 
additional information that defendant had a history of drug cnmes, Agent Burnett, also \\ ith 
the strike force, obtained a search warrant for the safe (R. 103:115-116) (a copy of the 
affidavit in support of the search warrant was not included m the record on appeal). Two 
baggies containing approximately 85.8 grams of marijuana were seized (R. 103:116, 119). 
In Agent Burnett's experience this amount was "too large" for merely personal use (R. 
103:123-24). Indeed, "an ounce is probably the average amount... This is four or fiv e times 
that amount" (id.). Additionally, defendant's manner of storing the marijuana in separate 
baggies and locations was also inconsistent with his claim of personal use (R. 103:124-125). 
Finally, a recreational user typically uses marijuana only one to three times per week, and the 
average pipe bowl only holds approximately one gram of marijuana, while a rolled joint 
holds "a little less depending on how big they want to roll it" (R. 103:126). Thus, 
defendant's approximate 129 grams of marijuana could be made into at least as many joints 
(R. 103:126-127,148). It would take the average marijuana user a little less than two years 
to consume this amount (R. 103:127). 
Addendum H 
Not Reported in P 2d 
(Cite as: 2000 WL 33250566 (Utah App.)) 
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available 
UNPUBLISHED OPINION CHECK COURT 
RULES BEFORE CITING 
Court of Appeals of Utah 
Daniel SHUNK, Petitioner, 
v 
Honorable Dennis FUCHS, Respondent 
Daniel SHUNK, Petitioner, 
v 
Honorable William BARRETT, Respondent 
Nos. 20000192-CA, 20000193-CA. 
May 4, 2000 
Daniel Shunk, Sheridan, OR, pro se 
Brent M Johnson, Salt Lake City, for respondents 
Before BENCH, BILLINGS, and DAVIS, JJ 
MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not for Official 
Publication) 
PER CURIAM 
*1 Petitioner seeks extraordinary relief from this 
court under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65B in 
the form of a writ directing the district court to act 
on a petition for habeas corpus filed in the district 
court For the reasons set forth below, we deny the 
petition for extraordinary relief 
A petition for extraordinary relief directed to a 
district court judge is governed by Rule 65B(d) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 19 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 19 
requires that a petition contain a statement of all 
persons whose interests might be substantially 
affected, a statement of the issues presented and of 
the relief sought, a statement of the facts necessary 
to an understanding of the issues presented, a 
statement of the reasons why no other plain, speedy 
or adequate remedy exists and why the relief should 
be granted, and copies of any order or other parts of 
Copr © West 2003 No Claim 
httn / /nnnt wpstlaw rnm/Hphvpn/ htm]r>A&c+— of^Pr^«^, 
Page 1 
the record which may be essential to an 
understanding of the matters set forth in the 
petition Utah RAppP 19(b) Petitioner has failed 
to comply with these requirements In particular, he 
has not identified all affected parties, stated the 
facts relevant to the relief he seeks, stated why no 
other plain, speedy or adequate remedy exists, or 
provided copies of necessary documents 
Further, Rule 65B(d) authorizes relief only where a 
court "has exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its 
discretion," or "failed to perform an act required by 
law" Utah RCivP 65B(d)(2)(A) "Where the 
challenged proceedings are judicial in nature, the 
court's review shall not extend further than to 
determine whether the respondent has regularly 
pursued its authority" Utah R Civ P 65B(d)(4) 
Petitioner fails to demonstrate how the trial court 
abused its discretion or failed to perform an act 
required by law While Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 65C directs a district court to determine 
whether a writ is subject to summary dismissal or 
whether it warrants a response, the rule does not set 
a time limit for such action Moreover, it is not clear 
whether the district court was even aware of the 
petition, as it was filed in the underlying criminal 
case rather than in a separate civil action, as 
required by Rule 65C Petitioner must file a notice 
to submit or other triggermg document to obtain 
respondent's consideration of his petition 
Finally, extraordinary relief may only be granted 
"where no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy 
is available " Utah R Civ P 65B(a), Utah R App P 
19(b)(4) Petitioner has an adequate remedy in the 
trial court for the relief he seeks Petitioner may 
move the district court to dismiss the charges 
pending against him and properly serve the motion 
on the State Petitioner must actively pursue the 
proper procedure in the district court before seeking 
relief from this court 
2000 WL 33250566 (Utah App ) 
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